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The epidemic of corporate tax abuse—corporations’ reliance on ag-
gressive, though arguably “legal” readings of the Code to claim valua-
ble tax benefits that Congress never intended—has been a persistent
focus of the tax community over the last decade.1  Monetary tax pen-
alties have failed to halt this abuse.  And once the government out-
laws a particular tax shelter, corporations move on to exploit a
seemingly infinite number of other gaps in the tax law.  The absence
of a silver bullet solution2 has recently led some to suggest that the
government consider an approach to corporate tax abuse that has
been used in other contexts for thousands of years–public shaming.3
The government can impose few punishments on an offender as
“dramatic and spectacular”4 as a shaming sanction.5  When the gov-
ernment imposes a shaming sanction, it condemns the offender in full
view of the community for engaging in a socially repugnant act.  By
resorting to shaming, the government invites the community to take
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1 In 1999, Treasury released a major report describing the thriving corporate tax shelter
market.  Treasury Dep’t, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:  Discussion, Analysis and
Legislative Proposals (1999), available at  http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/
ctswhite.pdf.  In addition, several significant articles written in the late 1990’s focused aca-
demic attention on the corporate tax shelter problem.  See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The
New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775 (June 21, 1999); Janet Novack &
Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X-Rated Tax Shelters, Forbes, Dec. 14, 1998, at 198.
2 Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a
Silver Bullet, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1939 (2005) (discussing lack of a “silver bullet” solution).
3 See notes 67–86 and accompanying text. R
4 United States v. William Anderson Co., Inc., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1983).
5 See notes 39–49 and accompanying text. R
541
Electronic copy available at: ht ps: /ssrn.co /abstract=1365888
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365888
\\server05\productn\T\TAX\62-4\TAX403.txt unknown Seq: 2 20-OCT-09 15:38
542 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:
part in the punishment process by “heap[ing] ignominy upon”6 the
offender.  An effective shaming sanction also might deter others from
emulating the shamed offender’s behavior.
Politicians, government officials, and academics have proposed a
number of shaming measures that would apply to corporations that
attempt to reduce their taxable income by investing in abusive tax
shelters.7  In 2004, for example, the U.S. Senate passed legislation that
would have required the Service to “make public the name” of any
corporation that participated in a tax shelter.8  Similar proposals in-
clude requiring corporations to announce to the public instances in
which they have paid certain monetary tax penalties to the Service as
a result of their use of tax shelters9 and authorizing the Service to
release publicly the details of tax shelter settlements that it enters into
with large corporations.10  Each of these measures would require Con-
gress to relax the broad confidentiality protections that currently pro-
hibit the government from publicly disseminating information
regarding taxpayer’s tax return or audit history.11
The rationale for applying shaming sanctions to corporations that
participate in tax shelters is that this punishment may achieve deter-
rence objectives that the exclusive application of monetary tax penal-
ties cannot.  Some have suggested that shaming sanctions could cause
the corporation’s community–consisting of shareholders, business
partners, and consumers–to ostracize the corporation and, as a result,
could deter corporate managers from pursuing the offensive tax be-
havior.  With varying degrees of success, the federal and state govern-
ments have deployed shaming sanctions to reduce other types of tax
noncompliance, including taxpayers’ delinquency in paying taxes, fail-
ure to file tax returns, and refusal to make required disclosures to the
Service.
This Article considers the merits of public shaming as a deterrent of
corporate tax abuse.  While several commentators have focused on
the potential advantages of shaming as a response to corporate tax
6 Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733, 737
(1998).
7 See notes 67-86 and accompanying text. R
8 Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 402, 150 Cong.
Rec. S. 5622, 5643 (May 18, 2004), discussed at notes 74-77 and accompanying text. R
9 Id.
10 See Dustin Stamper, Korb Pledges Careful Use of Press, More Guidance on Disclo-
sures, 2006 TNT 206-2 (Oct. 25, 2006); available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File; Donald
Korb, The War on Tax Shelters, Speech at NYU School of Law (Mar. 6, 2007) (discussing
IRS approach of releasing press releases regarding tax shelter settlements with large corpo-
rations)(notes on file with author).
11 See IRC § 6103(a).
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abuse,12 this Article examines their potential disadvantages.  My claim
is that, in contrast to their successful use in other tax enforcement
contexts, shaming sanctions would likely fail to deter corporations
from pursuing abusive tax shelters and, instead, could have the unin-
tended effect of weakening important aspects of tax compliance.  As a
result, I conclude that shaming should be rejected as a means of re-
ducing corporate tax abuse.
There are several significant reasons to question whether shaming
sanctions would be effective in deterring corporations from pursuing
abusive tax shelters. First, little evidence supports the claim that pub-
licity of a corporation’s tax shelter activity would lead to ostracism of
the corporation.  When the press has reported on high-profile public
tax shelter litigation in the past, the corporations involved have not
suffered significant drops in stock price, consumer boycotts of their
goods, or calls for management reform, even in cases where courts
have issued resounding pronouncements in favor of the government.
If past public reaction is any guide, shaming sanctions for corporate
tax abuse would be unlikely to inflict significant reputational harm on
corporate offenders and, as a result, their deterrence value would be
weak.  By contrast, when governments have publicly shamed corpora-
tions and other taxpayers for failing to abide by clear tax rules, such as
a requirement to timely pay outstanding tax liabilities, public reaction
has been negative.
Second, publicized information that a particular corporation has en-
gaged in abusive tax planning could actually send an unintended posi-
tive signal to the members of a corporation’s community.  Short-term
investors, like hedge and private equity funds, may be attracted to,
rather than repelled by, corporations with tax directors who claim tax
positions that “push the envelope.”  Investors could respond much
more favorably to news that a corporation attempted to cut its tax
expense by investing in a tax shelter than to news that the corporation
blatantly ignored an explicit tax rule, such as by failing to file a tax
return at all.  The potentially positive signal that a shaming sanction
for corporate tax abuse could emit, consequently, could significantly
diminish its deterrence value.
Finally, it is possible to surmise that the negative public reaction
that shaming sanctions might inflict would resonate with tax directors
who may fear personal loss, such as termination of their employment.
Anxiety over the risk of personal loss, in theory, could deter corporate
managers from claiming overly aggressive tax positions.  There are
two reasons, however, to reject this speculation.  First, when a corpo-
ration’s tax shelter activities have been exposed publicly in the past,
12 See notes 87-105 and accompanying text. R
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the tax director of the corporation involved did not suffer adverse pro-
fessional consequences.  Second, by the time the Service discovers a
corporation’s participation in a tax shelter, the tax director who origi-
nally authorized it no longer may be affiliated with the corporation.
In addition to failing to achieve deterrence objectives, shaming
sanctions could have the unintended effect of weakening important
aspects of tax compliance.  Some corporate tax directors could re-
spond to these sanctions by increasing their use of aggressive tax plan-
ning techniques.  As reciprocity theory hypothesizes, actors may
reduce their own contributions toward a public good if they begin to
feel like “chumps” for complying while others cheat.13  As a result of
public reports that well-known, respected corporations have author-
ized the use of abusive tax shelters, conservative tax directors could
develop the impression that their historic tax reporting practices have
been too cautious.  In response, these tax directors may increase their
use of aggressive corporate tax strategies.
Shaming sanctions also could trigger harmful forms of backlash
from tax directors and from the general taxpaying public.  Some tax
directors could react to the threat of shaming sanctions, at least in the
short term, by “overdisclosing” information to the Service.  The
overdisclosure strategy could enable tax directors to technically com-
ply with the tax shelter reporting rules, while simultaneously limiting
the ability of the Service to detect the corporation’s use of abusive tax
strategies that would likely result in the application of shaming sanc-
tions.  In addition, the use of shaming sanctions for this particular of-
fense could weaken general taxpaying morale.  Instead of repudiating
the corporations subject to shaming sanctions, the general taxpaying
public could show contempt toward the government for enacting
“loopholes” in the corporate tax law that corporations exploited.
Finally, the government’s threat of shaming sanctions for corpora-
tions that participate in tax shelters could increase the amount of tax
shelter litigation.  Current law allows a corporation to settle a tax shel-
ter dispute or pay a monetary penalty to the Service behind a curtain
of taxpayer confidentiality.  By pulling back that curtain, shaming
sanctions could encourage a corporation’s managers to resort to the
courts to challenge the Service’s ex post characterization of a particu-
lar transaction as a tax shelter rather than accept a public branding
from the Service as a tax shelter participant.  The danger of increased
litigation in the tax shelter area is that it would drain significant tax
enforcement resources and could increase the risk of high-profile gov-
ernment losses.
13 For further discussion, see Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453, 1487 (2003).
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows:  Part II discusses
the corporate tax abuse problem and the rise of shaming as a possible
response.  Part III suggests why shaming sanctions would fail to deter
corporations from pursuing abusive tax shelters.  Part IV argues that,
in addition to failing to achieve deterrence objectives, shaming sanc-
tions could have the adverse effect of weakening important aspects of
tax compliance.  Part V concludes.
II. SHAMING AS A RESPONSE TO CORPORATE TAX ABUSE
A. The Corporate Tax Abuse Problem
There is no universal definition of a corporate tax shelter.14  A tax
shelter is a complex transaction that may appear to comply with the
text of the Code, yet it provides its corporate user with valuable tax
benefits that Congress never envisioned.15  As Michael Graetz once
famously commented, a corporate tax shelter is “a deal done by very
smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be very stupid.”16
Consider just a few highly simplified examples of representative
corporate tax shelters:
• A series of complicated exchanges involving “contingent liabilities”
between a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary that enables
the corporation to claim a large tax loss that just happens to precisely
offset a large tax gain.17
• A purchase of several million dollars worth of stock by a corpora-
tion that then sells the stock back to its original owner minutes later,
resulting in the corporation’s access to millions of dollars in valuable
foreign tax credits.18
14 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, What’s a Tax Shelter?, 68 Tax Notes 879, 879 (Aug. 14,
1995) (“There is no consensus definition of a ‘tax shelter’ in the law or legal literature.”).
The most concrete guidance that the Code provides is that it describes a “tax shelter” as a
transaction with a “significant purpose of . . . avoidance of Federal income tax.”  IRC
§ 6662(d)(2)(C).
15 See Treasury Dep’t, note 1, at 130 (describing corporate tax shelter as “a transaction R
specifically designed to exploit a provision of the law in unintended ways”); Bankman,
note 1, at 1777 (“The tax shelter . . . produces a result that is inconsistent with commonly R
understood tax principles and is not supported by clearly defined legislative intent.”).  For
a discussion of the role that Congress’ intent should play in defining a transaction as a tax
shelter, see Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 Iowa L. Rev. __
(forthcoming, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345388.
16 Tom Herman, Tax Report, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A1.
17 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (contingent lia-
bility tax shelter).
18 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (dividend-
stripping tax shelter).
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• A multi-step transaction between a corporation and a Cayman Is-
lands bank that allows the corporation to “inflate” its tax basis in
stock and then incur a large tax loss by quickly selling that stock.19
In each of these transactions, the corporation did not stand to make
a pretax economic profit.  As a result, these deals are what Graetz
would call “very stupid.”  Yet, the corporate managers who authorized
these transactions considered them to be very smart deals.  In each
case, under a hyper-literal reading of the applicable tax law, the trans-
action produced a large tax loss or valuable tax credit that—like
magic—seemed to cause significant corporate tax liability to
disappear.
At the time corporations entered into these transactions, no tax
rules explicitly prohibited them.  In fact, they technically complied
with the tax rules then in effect.20  The Service, and at least some
courts, however, concluded that these transactions were corporate tax
shelters because they violated broad judicial tax standards.
Whether a particular law enables an actor to determine in advance
that his conduct is permissible is the feature that distinguishes a rule
from a standard.21  A rule is definite, concrete guidance that dictates
ex ante whether an actor may engage in specific conduct.22  A stan-
dard, on the other hand, consists of broad factors or guidelines that
only a judge or another adjudicator can apply ex post to determine
with certainty whether the actor’s conduct was permissible.23  A viola-
tion of a rule, for example, occurs when an individual drives her car at
90 miles per hour, despite the presence of a roadside sign that clearly
states “Speed Limit:  65 Miles Per Hour.”  A violation of a standard,
on the other hand, would have occured if the roadside sign had in-
stead read “No Driving at Excessive Speeds.”
19 Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129 (basis-shifting tax shelter).
20 For example, in the contingent liability tax shelter, the corporate taxpayer would con-
tribute cash plus contingent liabilities to a controlled subsidiary in exchange for stock in a
tax-free incorporation.  See IRC § 351.  While the corporation’s tax basis in its newly re-
ceived stock in the subsidiary would normally equal the value of the cash contributed re-
duced by any liabilities assumed by the subsidiary, the corporation would argue that under
the tax law at the time, it was not required to reduce its basis in the subsidiary stock be-
cause the liabilities were “contingent” on future events.  See IRC § 357(c)(3); Rev. Rul. 95-
74, 1995-2 C.B. 36.  The corporation then would sell its subsidiary stock for its fair market
value to a related entity and recognize a large tax loss.  See, e.g., Black & Decker 436 F.3d
431.  For a thorough discussion of this transaction, see Ethan D. Yale, Reexamining Black
& Decker’s Contingent Liability Tax Shelter, 108 Tax Notes 223 (July 11, 2005).
21 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J.
557, 560 (1992); see also Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insur-
ance, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 339, 363-68 (2005) (discussing rules/standards distinction in tax law).
22 Kaplow, note 21, at 560. R
23 Id.
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Upon reviewing the tax returns of the corporations that participated
in the transactions described above, the Service concluded that the tax
benefits resulting from these transactions were inconsistent with the
“economic substance” and “business purpose” tax standards.24  The
Service determined that the real purpose of each transaction was for
the corporation that pursued it to enjoy valuable tax benefits, not to
further any non-tax-related business objective or generate a pretax
profit.25
In the absence of comprehensive reform to the substantive tax law,
the government has adopted several second-best measures to address
the corporate tax abuse problem.  These measures have provided the
government with limited tools for halting the spread of abusive tax
strategies among corporate taxpayers.
The Service’s use of broad anti-abuse tax standards has had mixed
success.26  Corporations plan around these tax standards.27  At least
one court has held that a transaction did not violate the business pur-
pose tax standard even though the taxpayer entered into it “primarily
to get otherwise unavailable tax benefits in order to offset unrelated
tax liabilities and unrelated capital gains.”28  Another court has taken
the position that tax shelter standards are retroactive, “judge-made”
law and cannot be applied to trump the literal words of the Code.29
While Congress has enacted explicit tax rules that prohibit corpora-
tions from claiming tax benefits using certain abusive tax strategies, it
almost always has done so after large numbers of taxpayers have en-
gaged in them.30  Once Congress learned of the contingent liability tax
shelter, for example, it enacted a targeted statutory fix to prevent cor-
porations from using this technique in the future.31  As Congress af-
firmatively outlaws newly discovered corporate tax shelters by statute,
24 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F. 3d 431, 440-43(4th Cir. 2006); Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F. 3d 778, 781-88 (5th Cir. 2001); Notice 2001-45,
2001-2 C.B. 129, 129.  For discussion, see, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance
Doctrine, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 5 (2000); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Eco-
nomic Substance, 52 Tax Law. 235 (1999).
25 See Black & Decker, 436 F.3d. at 440-43; Compaq 277 F.3d at 781-88; Notice 2001-45,
2001-2 C.B. 129, 129.
26 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, note 2, at 1940. R
27 Or as Senator Carl Levin once commented of the economic substance doctrine, cor-
porations construct “all of this mumbo jumbo, all of these boxes and arrows . . . to create
an impression of economic activity when there is none.”  150 Cong. Rec. S. 5191, 5214
(May 11, 2004) (statement of Sen. Levin).
28 Compaq, 277 F.3d at 786.
29 See, e.g., Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 755 (2004), rev’d,
454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Justice Scalia, “Judge-made law is ex post facto law
. . .”).
30 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, note 2, at 1941, for further discussion. R
31 IRC § 358(h).
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corporations stop using those strategies and move on to exploit other
gaps in the tax law.32
Monetary tax penalties also have had limited effect in deterring cor-
porate tax abuse.  Assuming corporate tax directors act like other ra-
tional actors, they weigh the potential costs and benefits of a
particular tax strategy before engaging in it.33  As a result of the low
probability that the Service will detect and challenge successfully most
corporate tax shelters, tax directors discount the potential monetary
tax penalties that may result from engaging in an abusive tax
strategy.34
Finally, the government has enacted mandatory disclosure rules as a
mechanism for increasing the probability of detection and deterring
participation in abusive tax strategies.35  Under this regime, corpora-
tions must report to the Service their participation in transactions that
the Service specifically has designated as abusive “listed transac-
tions,”36 as well as in transactions that bear more general tax shelter
traits.37  Like Congress’ enactment of targeted statutory solutions,
however, the mandatory disclosure regime produces cat-and-mouse
dynamics between the Service and corporations such that corpora-
32 Chirelstein & Zelenak, note 2, at 1950 (“[T]he government cannot win this game.”). R
As Daniel Shaviro has written, the Service’s designation of a particular tax strategy as a
listed transaction often stops corporate managers from continuing to exploit that strategy
because the Service “would have to be radically and surprisingly wrong if it did not consist-
ently succeed in identifying transactions that have at least some significant chance of losing
on economic substance, business purpose or similar grounds.”  Daniel N. Shaviro, Disclo-
sure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S., Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters (NYU
School of Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-05, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=955354.
33 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:  Deceit, Deter-
rence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569 (2006) (discussing the ex-
pected value analysis that tax directors perform).
34 See Raskolnikov, note 33, at 571. R
35 Reg. § 1.6011-4 (taxpayer disclosure requirements); Reg. § 301.6111-3(d)(1) (material
advisor disclosure requirements).
36 Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).  The Service maintains the list of abusive tax shelters on its
website, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/.
37 Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(3), (4), (5) (providing disclosure obligations regarding confiden-
tial transactions, transactions with contractual protection, and loss transactions).  In certain
cases, these reporting obligations apply even though a particular transaction was not sub-
ject to mandatory disclosure rules at the time corporate taxpayers engaged in it.  Corpora-
tions must report to the Service their participation in transactions that become listed
transactions after corporations have entered into them using Form 8886 and must file a
disclosure statement with the Service’s Office of Tax Shelter Analysis within ninety calen-
dar days after the date on which the transaction became a listed transaction.  Reg. § 1.6011-
4(e)(2)(i).
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tions cease participating in listed transactions and explore other tax
avoidance strategies that are not subject to mandatory disclosure.38
B. Considering Shaming
The lack of effective monetary penalties and comprehensive anti-
abuse standards under current law has forced politicians, government
officials, and academics to search for alternative approaches to the
corporate tax abuse problem.  The age-old practice of shaming has
emerged as one such alternative.
This Section provides a general overview of shaming, describes past
uses of shaming sanctions as a means of promoting tax compliance,
and examines recent proposals to empower the government to use
similar techniques against corporations that pursue abusive tax
shelters.
1. What Is Shaming?
Social institutions have used shaming as a mechanism for preserving
social order for thousands of years.  In ancient Rome, the doors to the
homes of criminals were branded to alert the public of the deeds of
the residents who lived behind them.39  In colonial America, offenders
of certain customs were famously locked in pillories and subjected to a
barrage of rotten vegetables from the disapproving crowd.40  In mod-
ern times, creative judges have sentenced felons to wear bright orange
vests that proclaim “I AM A DRUNK DRIVER”41 and local jurisdic-
tions have published in their town newspapers the names of individu-
als who have participated in a variety of offensive activities, such as
the solicitation of prostitutes42 and public urination.43
In each of these examples, a social institution condemns an actor for
violating a shared moral norm and issues the condemnation in a dra-
38 See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure:  Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 1629, 1642-52 (2009) (discussing taxpayer techniques for avoiding
mandatory disclosure obligations).
39 See Roland Muller, Honor and Shame:  Unlocking the Door 53 (2000) (describing
Roman shaming).
40 For a graphically detailed description of these punishments, see Alice Morse Earle,
Curious Punishments of Bygone Days 28-50, 87-95 (Singapore Tree Press 1968) (1896).
41 This practice has been implemented in Tennessee.  T.C.A. § 55-10-403(s)(5).
42 See Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex in the Sunlight:  The Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes’ Pa-
trons, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1525 (1996).
43 See Clifford J. Levy, Cracking Down in a Drinking Town;  Hoboken Battles Public
Urination, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1994, at A21 (describing the fight against public urination in
Hoboken, New Jersey), discussed in Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-
Collar Criminals:  A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. &
Econ. 365, 365 (1999).
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matic and public fashion.  Shaming sanctions do not require the of-
fender to pay a monetary fine or endure physical incarceration.
Rather, they alert the offender’s community to his actions and, when
they are effective, provoke communal ostracism of the offender.  As
Dan Kahan and Eric Posner have defined shaming, it is “the process
by which citizens publicly and self-consciously draw attention to the
bad dispositions or actions of an offender, as a way of punishing him
for having those dispositions or engaging in those activities.”44
Anthropological and psychological studies regarding the influence
of shaming sanctions on a community’s treatment of an offender and
its deterrent effect on potential offenders imply that certain factors
must be present for a shaming sanction to achieve its desired effect.45
Toni Massaro has synthesized from these studies the following four
factors that she argues are critical to the success of a shaming sanction:
First, an offender subject to a shaming sanction must belong to an
identifiable community, such that its members would recognize the
offender.46
Second, the shaming sanction must adversely affect the offender’s
social status in the community, resulting in public scorn and commu-
nal ostracism of the offender.47
44 Kahan & Posner, note 43, at 368.  Shaming as a method of punishment has been sub- R
ject to significant criticism in the legal literature, especially when applied against individual
offenders, rather than entities or institutions.  Martha Nussbaum, for instance, has argued
that when a judge imposes a shaming sanction on an individual convicted of drunk driving,
the judge aims to “mark a person as having a deviant identity” and invite the public “to
scoff at the person’s spoiled identity.”  Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity:  Dis-
gust, Shame, and the Law 230-31 (2004).  In Nussbaum’s view, such state-sponsored forms
of shaming are “incompatible with the proper public regard for the equal dignity of all
citizens.”  Id. at 231.
Criminal law scholars have offered significantly less criticism, and even acceptance, of
shaming when applied against corporations.  In contrast, to her criticism of shaming as
applied to individual offenders, Nussbaum, for example, has written that “shaming penal-
ties might be appropriate for organizations that do harm, where they would be inappropri-
ate as applied to individuals . . . [because] organizations cannot suffer the deep harms that
individuals suffer.”  Id. at 244.  For criminal law scholars like Nussbaum, a shaming mea-
sure applied to a corporation does not appear to provoke dignity concerns.
45 Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
1880, 1883 (1991) (discussing anthropological and sociological studies regarding shaming
sanctions).
46 Id.  Massaro has argued that because communities today consist of millions of individ-
uals, a shaming sanction applied against one of these individuals may be unlikely to pro-
voke communal ostracism.  Id. at 17 (“Unlike the intimate face-to-face cultures that rely
heavily on shaming, cities in the United States typically are not characterized by high inter-
dependence among citizens, strong norm cohesiveness, or robust communitarianism.”).
47 Id. at 1883.
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Third, potential offenders must fear the imposition of a shaming
sanction, which should deter them from pursuing the offensive con-
duct at issue.48
Last, procedures must exist to reintegrate the offender into the
community at some future point, so that members of the community
maintain respect for the institution that applies the shaming
sanction.49
2. Past Uses Against Tax Noncompliance
Just as social institutions have attempted to publicly shame actors
who have participated in socially undesirable activities such as envi-
ronmental pollution or sex offenses, they also have applied this form
of punishment against taxpayers who have failed to comply with vari-
ous aspects of the tax system.  Three prominent examples of tax of-
fenses for which governments and courts have applied shaming
sanctions include taxpayers’ delinquency in paying an established tax
liability, failure to file tax returns, and refusal to make required disclo-
sures to the Service.50
Failure to Pay.  Over a third  of the nation’s states have showcased
the identities of businesses and individuals that have failed to pay
their outstanding tax liability on time by using dramatic public web-
sites51 like Maryland’s “Caught in the Web,”52 South Carolina’s
“Debtor’s Corner,”53 and Wisconsin’s “Website of Shame.”54
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 The following are not the only examples of past uses of shaming sanctions in tax
enforcement.  One example that I do not discuss is the federal government’s attempts to
shame individual U.S. taxpayers who expatriate in order to reduce their tax liabilities.  For
discussion of that provision, see Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal
Tax Law:  Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective
Tax Policy, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 863 (2004).
51 Ben Jones, Latest Tax Tool: ”Internet Shaming; States Try to Embarrass Debtors into
Paying by Posting Their Names” USA Today, Dec. 23, 2005 at A1 (“At least 18 states have
launched websites to post the names of people and businesses that owe back taxes.”).
52 Comptroller of Maryland, Caught in the Web, at http://compnet.comp.state.md.us/
Compliance_Division/Collections/General_Collections_Information/Caught_in_the_Web.
shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
53 South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, Debtor’s Corner, at http://www.sctax.org/delin-
quent/delinquent.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
54 Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, Wisconsin Delinquent Taxpayers, at http://www.reve-
nue.wi.gov/html/delqlist.html (last visited Sept.27, 2009); see also Spies Online, Delinquent
Taxpayers, http://www.spiesonline.net/delinquent-taxpayers.shtml (last visited Sept. 27,
2009) (providing access to state shaming websites).  Since 2007, the California Franchise
Tax Board has published an annual list of the top 250 taxpayers with liened state income
tax delinquencies of greater than $100,000.  See http://www.ftb.ca.gov/individuals/txdlnqnt.
shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).  Celebrities such as Burt Reynolds, O.J. Simpson, Dionne
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The mechanics of most states’ shaming programs are relatively sim-
ple.  In Wisconsin, the Department of Revenue identifies taxpayers
that owe more than $5,000 in assessed, unpaid state tax liability.55  Af-
ter their appeal rights have expired and there is no legal dispute as to
the amount of outstanding tax liability, the Department of Revenue
mails a “Notice of Pending Internet Posting” to these taxpayers warn-
ing them that if they do not make payment, their names and amounts
of outstanding tax liabilities will be posted on the Website of Shame.56
State revenue agencies report that taxpayers have responded posi-
tively to the shaming campaigns, paying millions of dollars in out-
standing taxes in recent years.  When the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue inaugurated the Website of Shame in January 2005, for ex-
ample, it anticipated that it would collect $1.5 million in unpaid tax
liability during its first year of operation.57  One year later, the depart-
ment reported that it had collected over fifteen times that amount
from previously unreachable taxpayers from Oshkosh to Sheboygan
to Waukesha, and that payment checks continued to arrive each day.58
Other states that have implemented delinquent taxpayer websites
have reported that the approach has enabled them to collect hundreds
of millions of dollars.59  State revenue officials also have reported that
from the start to finish of each year, the number of names on their lists
of delinquent taxpayers has decreased as taxpayers pay outstanding
tax liabilities.60
Failure to File. Courts often apply shaming sanctions against de-
fendants who have failed to file federal tax returns.  The Colorado
Supreme Court, for example, has frequently sentenced attorneys who
Warwick, and Sinbad have appeared on the list.  See 3 Celebrities on List of California Tax
Evaders, L.A. Times, Apr.10, 2009, at A3.
55 Wis. Stat. § 73.03(62); Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, Wisconsin Delinquent Taxpayers,
available at http://www.revenue.wi.gov/html/delqlist.html (lowering threshold tax delin-
quency for public posting from $25,000 to $5,000).
56 Wis. Stat. § 73.03(62).  The Wisconsin Department of Revenue does not post taxpay-
ers’ information if they have entered agreements to settle their tax liability or if they are
bankrupt.  Id.
57 Editorial, Shaming Scofflaws Seems To Be Working, Sheb. Press, Jan. 2, 2007, availa-
ble at http://www.sheboygan-press.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070102/SHE06/
701020365/1883 (citing reports on progress of Website of Shame).
58 Id.
59 Kristen Wyatt, States Use Shame as Tax Collecting Tool:  Web Sites Publish Name of
Residents with Delinquent Bills, Wash. Post, May 9, 2004, at A10 (describing reports from
state revenue officials on success of shaming websites); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Pri-
vacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1065, 1133 (2003) (commenting on the posi-
tive results of shaming websites, including those of Connecticut and Massachusetts).
60 Steven Walters, Taxpayer List Scares Up Cash, Mil. J. Sentinel, May 30, 2006, at B3
(reporting on decreases of number names on Wisconsin’s delinquent taxpayer list from
January 1, 2006 to mid-May, 2006).
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consistently fail to file federal tax returns to “public censure” for com-
mitting acts of “dishonesty, fraud [and] deceit.”61
Commentators have noted that the use of shaming sanctions for
failure to file a tax return may be especially effective in cases where
the offender’s reputation for integrity within his local community is
central to his ability to earn a living.  With respect to cases involving
lawyers, Leslie Levin has written that, compared to ordinary citizens,
these actors “usually value their reputations within the larger commu-
nity and may be more likely to respond to shaming sanctions.”62
Courts and attorney grievance committees, accordingly, have relied
on shaming sanctions as a way to discourage lawyers and others from
ignoring their obligations to comply with tax return filing
requirements.
Failure to Disclose.  A final example of shaming as a means of tax
enforcement can be found in the Code’s treatment of corporations
that fail to make certain required disclosures of information to the
Service.
As noted above, the Service frequently designates certain tax strate-
gies as “listed transactions,” its formal name for abusive tax shelters.
When the Service designates a particular strategy as a listed transac-
tion, corporations are required to inform the Service if they partici-
pate in that transaction in the future.  If the Service designates a
strategy as a listed transaction after a corporation has already used it
to claim tax benefits, the corporation may be required to disclose to
the Service after the fact.63  Failure to disclose participation in listed
transactions subjects corporations to a nonwaivable $200,000 tax pen-
alty for each offense.64  The shaming aspect of these rules is that the
Code also requires a corporation that pays a penalty for failing to
comply with these disclosure requirements to report the payment in
public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.65
Shaming sanctions for failure to disclose required information ap-
pear to have had some success in encouraging corporate tax directors
to adopt a more rigorous approach to disclosure.  In response to the
threat of these sanctions, tax directors, lawyers, and accountants have
engaged in numerous public discussions regarding procedures that
61 See, e.g., People v. Borchard, 825 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1992); People v. Tauger, 893 P.2d
121 (Colo. 1995) (sentencing defendants to public censure for failing to file federal income
tax returns in multiple years).
62 Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Discipline Standards, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 75 n.342 (1998).
63 Reg. § 1.6011-4(e)(2)(i).
64 IRC § 6707A(b)(2).
65 IRC § 6707A(e)(2).
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corporations should adopt to ensure that they comply with the Ser-
vice’s disclosure requirements.66
3. Proposed Uses of Shaming Against Corporate Tax Abuse
As traditional approaches to the corporate tax abuse problem have
proven inadequate, politicians, government officials, and academics
have proposed that the federal government consider applying shaming
sanctions similar to the measures described above against corpora-
tions that pursue abusive tax shelters.
Jay Soled and Dennis Ventry, for instance, have suggested that pub-
lic shaming could be implemented to reduce the federal “tax gap,” the
difference between the amount of tax that taxpayers should pay and
the amount that is paid voluntarily and on time.67  As Soled and Ven-
try have argued, “Enforcement through shaming could attack all
forms of tax abuse.  These include high-income and corporate taxpay-
ers who take artificial losses to offset taxable gains.”68  Rather than
restricting their support for shaming to measures directed toward indi-
vidual taxpayers or tax delinquents, Soled and Ventry favor the use of
shaming to punish corporations that engage in the type of abusive tax
shelters discussed above.69  Other tax scholars have offered similar
sentiments regarding the merits of shaming corporations that partici-
pate in abusive tax planning.70
To enact shaming sanctions along the lines of those that tax scholars
have suggested, the government first would need to make substantive
revisions to confidentiality restrictions under current law.  Section
6103 of the Code prohibits the Service from publicly disseminating
information related to a specific taxpayer’s tax return–including any
corporate taxpayer–such as the amount of its tax liability, payment of
66 For a representative sampling, see, e.g., Christian M. McBurney, Public Companies
Need to Identify Reportable Transactions to Avoid SEC Disclosure, 103 J. Tax’n 5 (2005)
(outlining formal written procedures that tax directors should adopt to avoid disclosure
failures); Herbert N. Beller, The New Penalty Regime:  Proceed with Caution!, 106 Tax
Notes 311 (Jan. 17, 2005) (describing significance of shaming sanctions for non-disclosure).
67 Jay A. Soled & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., A Little Shame Might Just Deter Tax Cheaters,
USA Today, Apr. 10, 2008, at 12A.  Soled and Ventry further argue that a federal shaming
program should be implemented to address “wayward tax advisers.”  Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty:  Will Publicizing Tax Infor-
mation Increase Compliance?, 18 Can J. Law & Jur. 95, 112 (2005) (“Limiting publicity to
public corporations has distinct advantages.  Not only would it target some of the largest
taxpayers (with the largest deficiencies), but it would also focus on a compliance problem
much in the public awareness”); Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and
Corporate Tax Shelters:  Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liabil-
ity, 29 J. Corp. L. 219, 222 (2004) (offering public disclosure proposals designed to “to
shame the participants and purveyors of potentially abusive tax shelter transactions”).
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civil tax penalties, and results of audits.71  In its own internal manual,
the Service warns its employees to avoid any public disclosure that
could “damage the reputation of the taxpayer.”72
In recent years, politicians and government officials have offered
several proposals to amend or circumvent the taxpayer confidentiality
rules under current law to empower the federal government to apply
public shaming sanctions against participants in corporate tax abuse.
These proposals reflect the arguments in favor of shaming sanctions
for corporate tax abuse that tax scholars have offered.73  Three of
these proposals–public shaming lists for corporate tax abuse partici-
pants, public tax shelter penalties, and public tax shelter settle-
ments–are discussed briefly below.
Public Shaming Lists.  In 2004, the Senate passed legislation that
would have required the Service to inform the public of the identities
of corporations that participated in tax shelters.  The legislation would
have required the Service “to make public the name” of any corpora-
tion that would be required to pay a penalty attributable to a transac-
tion that lacks economic substance.74  Under the legislation, a
transaction would lack economic substance if it did not result in a
meaningful change in a taxpayer’s economic position, apart from tax
effects, and failed to serve a substantial nontax purpose.75  The Ser-
vice would likely have used its website to compile a list of corpora-
tions that engaged in “non-economic substance” transactions, just as
state taxing authorities have used the internet to publicize the identi-
ties of individuals and business that are delinquent in paying estab-
lished tax liabilities.76  Senator Charles Grassley, the Senate Finance
Committee Chairman, implied that the Service’s public announce-
ments would punish the featured corporations by causing their current
and future shareholders to reconsider “whether they want to invest in
a company with clouded business ethics.”77
Public Tax Shelter Penalties.  A related provision of the 2004 legisla-
tion would have obligated corporations to disclose publicly their pay-
ment of any penalties for engaging in non-economic substance
71 IRC § 6103(a).
72 IRS, Internal Revenue Manual, Handbook for Special Agents, § 347.2, at 9781-11.
73 See Beale, note 70, at 222; Kornhauser, note 70, at 112; Soled & Ventry, note 67, at R
12A.
74 Jumpstart our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 402, 150 Cong.
Rec. S. 5622, 5643 (May 18, 2004).
75 Id. § 401.
76 See notes 51–60 and accompanying text. R
77 Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, Grassley Highlights Corporate Loophole
Closers in New Tax Bill (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/
2004/prg101404.pdf.
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transactions.78  Under current law, a corporation’s managers have sig-
nificant discretion over whether to reveal publicly that the corporation
has participated in an abusive tax shelter.  If a corporation pays a
monetary tax penalty to the Service for engaging in a tax shelter, the
corporation may not describe this payment in a public filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if its managers do not consider
the event to be “material.”79  Even if it is material, they may use
vague language to report the event.80  This proposal would have guar-
anteed that a corporation inform shareholders, employees, and the
media of instances in which it had paid a monetary tax penalty to the
Service for engaging in an abusive tax strategy.
Public Tax Shelter Settlements.  Last, the Service recently has begun
experimenting with shaming sanctions by making public announce-
ments of its tax shelter settlements with large corporations.  Gener-
ally, any settlements between the Service and corporate taxpayers are
protected by confidentiality rules.81  The Service, however, has begun
to enter settlement agreements with corporations that have claimed
tax benefits using tax shelters, but it has insisted that as a condition of
the settlement, the corporations sign confidentiality waivers.82
Describing the technique, Donald Korb, the former Chief Counsel of
the Service, explained that when a corporation expresses an interest in
resolving a potential tax shelter dispute, “we say okay, but as part of
the settlement, we’ll put out a press release naming you.”83  The typi-
cal press release may describe the corporation’s participation in an
abusive tax shelter and the terms of the settlement, including the tax
liability, penalties, and interest ultimately owed.84  While the practice
is still is in its infancy, the Service has issued press releases in tax shel-
ter settlements with major corporations85 and is considering increased
use of this approach.86
78 Jumpstart our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 402, 150 Cong.
Rec. S. 5622, 5643 (May 18, 2004).
79 SEC Regulation S-K, Item 103, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2006).
80 See Beale, note 70, at 247 (“Any material information about risky tax transactions R
tends to be hidden . . .”).
81 IRC § 6103(a).
82 See Stamper, note 10 (summarizing public press release approach). R
83 Korb, note 10. R
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Press Release, IRS, IRS Accepts Settlement Offer on Contingent Liability
Tax Shelter (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=132350,
00.html (Hercules settlement); Press Release, IRS, Merck Agrees to Pay IRS $2.3 Billion
(Feb. 14, 2007), available at available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=167773,
00.html (Merck settlement).
86 See Stamper, note 10. R
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C. Why Shame Corporate Tax Abuse?
Politicians, government officials, and tax scholars have suggested
that the use of shaming sanctions in the corporate tax abuse context
could be an effective deterrent.87  This Subpart outlines three possible
arguments in favor of such shaming measures:  (1) they would apply
against recognizable offenders that are members of identifiable com-
munities; (2) they would result in communal ostracism; and (3) they
would discourage corporate managers from engaging in abusive tax
planning.
1. Recognizable Offenders
The use of shaming sanctions against corporations that pursue abu-
sive tax shelters would expose the actions of easily recognizable actors
that belong to identifiable communities.  As Massaro’s analysis sum-
marized above demonstrates, unless the offender that is subject to a
shaming sanction is recognizable within a community, the threat of
ostracism or reputational damage resulting from a shaming sanction is
weak.88
The corporations that have participated in abusive tax shelters since
the late 1990’s, however, have been some of the most well-known blue
chip corporations.  Proponents of the corporate tax abuse shaming
measures described above would likely argue that the corporations
that could be subject to them would be recognizable offenders that
belong to various identifiable communities–consisting of shareholders,
stock analysts, business partners, employees, consumers, and the
press–that are capable of ostracism and damage to social status.89  As
criminal law scholars Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite concluded in
their groundbreaking study, The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Of-
fenders, “it is fanciful to suggest that corporate entities inherently lack
the capacity to be stigmatized because they are fictitious beings, with-
out friends and neighbors.”90  A large corporation, thus, is analogous
87 See Korb, note 10; Grassley, note 77; Kornhauser, note 70, at 112; Beale, note 70, at R
222; Soled & Ventry, note 67, at 12A. R
88 Massaro, note 45, at 1883. R
89 See, e.g., Soled & Ventry, note 67, at 12A. R
90 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders 291
(1983).  Other criminal law scholars contend that corporate managers may fear association
with a corporation subject to a shaming sanction for engaging in acts like defrauding cus-
tomers or misleading investors because, as Jayne Barnard has argued, “for top-level man-
agers and members of their social class, fear of being shamed before their family members
and peers may even exceed the fear of criminal prosecution, exposure to civil lawsuits, or
other forms of officially imposed sanctions.”  Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in
Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 959, 967 (1999).
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to a modern-day Hester Prynne,91 a well-known actor who operates
within a close-knit community.
2. Damage to Social Status
Some commentators have suggested that, consistent with Massaro’s
analysis, publicity of a corporation’s use of an abusive tax shelter
could emit a negative signal that could result in damage to social sta-
tus and communal ostracism.92
By revealing a corporation’s participation in an abusive tax shelter,
the government could insinuate that the corporation could be engaged
in deceit in nontax areas as well.93  Economists Mihir Desai and
Dhammika Dharmapala have identified a correlation between corpo-
rations that have pursued tax shelters and those that have demon-
strated “obfuscatory actions” in preparing financial earnings reports.94
It is possible that a shaming sanction for corporate tax abuse could
lead a corporation’s shareholders and others to suspect that the corpo-
ration’s managers also are inclined to commit financial accounting
fraud, to withhold material information regarding the corporation’s
business objectives, and to act improperly with business partners and
consumers.95
Some tax advisors have asserted that such suspicions could cause a
corporation’s stock price to drop, its consumers to lose confidence in
its products, and private and government regulators to increase scru-
tiny of the corporation.96  By contrast, when a corporation pays a
91 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter 51 (Bantam Books, 1988) (1850).
92 See, e.g., Kornhauser, note 70, at 104 (“publicity strengthens penalties because R
it. . .increases chances of public shaming for non-compliance”); David Lenter, Joel Slemrod
& Douglas Shackelford, Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information:  Ac-
counting, Economics, and Legal Issues, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 803, 820 (2003) (theorizing that in
response to publicity of corporate tax shelter activity, “[s]ome company officials might feel
ashamed at being officers of companies revealed to be less than good corporate citizens”).
93 See Grassley, note 77 (linking evidence of corporate tax shelter activity to “clouded R
business ethics”).
94 See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management, Corporate
Tax Shelters, and Book-Tax Alignment, 62 Nat’l Tax J. 169, 183-4 (2009) (“[T]ax avoidance
demands obfuscatory actions that can be bundled with diversionary activities, including
earnings manipulation, to advance the interests of managers rather than shareholders.”).
95 Further, inclusion on a list could cause a corporation to suffer “guilt by association”
with other corporate offenders.  See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1811, 1836 (2001) (discussing lists and rosters in corporate shaming).  By
contrast, when a corporation pays a monetary tax penalty, it makes an isolated transfer to
the Service that does not involve similar public or private grouping with other
corporations.
96 See KPMG International, Tax in the Boardroom:  A Discussion Paper 16 (2004),
available at http://www.kpmg.com.au/aci/docs/tax-boardroom.pdf (“‘naming and shaming’
attacks on alleged tax avoiders can damage their reputations in the eyes of important
stakeholders, which can lead to sharp short-term share price falls and the unwelcome at-
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monetary tax penalty to the Service that is protected by confidential-
ity laws, similar adverse reputational consequences may not occur be-
cause the corporation may not publicly disclose this event in public
filings or announcements.97
3. Fear of Shaming Sanctions
A final possible rationale in favor of shaming sanctions for corpo-
rate tax abuse is that this approach would satisfy one of Massaro’s key
factors by deterring corporate managers from pursuing tax strategies
that could trigger the sanctions, as they would fear the possibility of
reputational damage for the corporation and personal costs for them-
selves.98  Senator Norm Coleman, for example, has commented that
the proposal to require the Service to announce publicly the identities
of corporate tax shelter participants can be viewed as “putting real
deterrence in place.”99  Likewise, former Chief Counsel Donald Korb
has commended his new approach to tax shelter settlements, where
the Service publicizes the settlements, as “sending shivers down every-
one’s spine”100 because “no one wants to be on the front cover of the
Wall Street Journal”101 for investing in a tax shelter.
One could further speculate that if the Service were to publicize a
corporation’s tax shelters, a tax director might worry that manage-
ment could terminate her employment as a way to signal that the
source of the abusive tax activity has been severed from the organiza-
tion.102  In cases of corporate financial accounting misreporting, for
instance, one scholar has demonstrated that “stakeholders appear to
reward restating firms that decouple themselves from the scandal in a
tention of more than one taxing authority.”); Ernst & Young LLP, Tax Transparency Dy-
namics and Impact on Clients and Their Advisors 4 (Apr. 1, 2006), 2006 TNT 69-10 (Apr.
11, 2006), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (describing fear among senior manage-
ment of “being the subject of media coverage arising from a transaction, including a tax
planning transaction, that might . . . inflict damage to corporate reputations and stock
prices”).
97 See notes 79-80 and accompanying text. R
98 A prominent practitioner has echoed these sentiments, remarking that as potential for
reputational harm grows, “pursuit of aggressive tax strategies . . . is bound to be rejected by
management on the basis that it creates risk to the enterprise disproportionate to any pos-
sible benefit.”  Peter C. Canellos, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Memorandum to Cli-
ents, More Tax Shelter Developments (Nov. 10, 2004) (on file with author).
99 150 Cong. Rec. S. 5191, 5216 (May 11, 2004) (statement of Sen. Coleman).
100 Korb, note 10. R
101 Donald Korb, Speech at Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Ctr. Forum on Tax Shelters
(Feb. 11, 2005), transcript available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/newsevents/.
102 See id.
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substantive way,” such as by replacing their chief executive officers.103
In response to the imposition of a corporate tax abuse shaming sanc-
tion, termination of the tax director could similarly allow management
to declare that the offensive behavior was the act of a single individual
that the corporation no longer employs.
There is some anecdotal evidence that the fear of personal costs as a
result of corporate abuse publicity exists among corporate tax direc-
tors.  In perhaps the greatest of ironies, the remaining national ac-
counting firms–the organizations that fueled the tax shelter boom of
the late 1990’s–now advertise “reputation risk management” services
to the tax directors of major corporations.104  A glossy brochure from
PricewaterhouseCoopers, for instance, informs tax directors
ominously,
We have collected a file of press cuttings relating to the tax
affairs of companies – and this file is becoming increasingly
bulky. How will your CEO or the board react to seeing your
tax affairs splashed all over the front page of a national news-
paper (or even on the inside pages)?105
A subtext of this accounting firm’s pitch is that tax directors should
consider steps to protect their corporations from adverse tax shelter
publicity because such publicity could threaten their jobs.
III. WHY SHAMING WOULD LIKELY FAIL TO DETER CORPORATE
TAX ABUSE
The theory underlying shaming as an approach to corporate tax
abuse is appealing.  If guaranteed public exposure of a corporation’s
tax shelter activity could indeed harm its social standing and reputa-
tion within its community of shareholders, business partners, and con-
sumers, then shaming sanctions could alter the cost-benefit analysis
that tax directors perform when considering tax strategies.  By threat-
ening to subject corporations that pursue tax shelters to the will of an
“uncontrolled general populace,”106 in theory, shaming sanctions
could empower the government to deter corporate managers in ways
103 Jared Harris, Do Firms Do “Worse” by Doing “Bad”? Financial Misrepresentation
and Subsequent Firm Performance, Academy of Mgmt. Best Conference Paper 5 (2007),
available at http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/harrisj/pdf/Harris%202007.pdf.
104 See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Tax Risk Management (2004) (on file with
author); KPMG International, note 96; Ernst & Young LLP, Tax Risk Management:  The R
Evolving Role of Tax Directors (2004) (on file with author).
105 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, note 104, at 8 (emphasis added). R
106 James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 Yale L.J.
1055, 1088 (1998).
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that the exclusive use of monetary tax penalties, shielded by taxpayer
confidentiality, cannot.107
There are several reasons, however, to question whether shaming
sanctions would actually deter corporate tax abuse.  As discussed in
the following Sections, consumers, investors, and business partners
have not demonstrated noticeable hostility in the past toward corpora-
tions that have been involved in high-profile tax shelter cases, rational
investors may even perceive a corporation’s willingness to engage in
tax shelters as a positive signal, and corporate tax directors may not
suffer personal loss from publicity of their corporations’ abusive tax
activities.  As a result, I conclude that it is unlikely that this approach
would discourage corporate managers from engaging in abusive tax
planning.
A. Lack of Ostracism for Corporate Offenders
As anthropological and sociological studies have demonstrated, to
deter actors from engaging in undesirable behavior, shaming sanctions
must threaten to harm their reputations within their communities.108
Hester Prynne was sentenced to wear a scarlet A so that members of
her community would witness the dramatic punishment as “taking her
out of the ordinary relations with humanity, and enclosing her in a
sphere by herself.”109  The Puritan town leaders of Hawthorne’s fa-
mous story sought to impose a punishment that would cause Prynne to
experience visible isolation from her community and, in turn, deter
others from emulating her behavior.  Without the threat of reputa-
tional harm and visible communal ostracism, a shaming sanction
would be a poor deterrent.
Past uses of shaming sanctions in tax enforcement appear to have
instilled fear of reputational harm in the minds of many delinquent
taxpayers.  State revenue agencies report that their shaming websites
have been successful because taxpayers fear that communal ostracism
could follow publicity of their tax delinquencies.110  According to
107 Id. at 1063.
108 See Massaro, note 45. R
109 Hawthorne, note 91, at 51. R
110 See Tom Herman, Deadbeats Risk Cybershame, States Use Threats of Public Dis-
grace to Collect Taxes, Wall St. J., June 27, 2007, at D2 (quoting California Franchise Tax
Board spokesman as concluding , “When we studied other states’ programs, we discovered
it’s the notice indicating your name could appear on the Web that brings in the lion’s share
of cash. . . . People are paying their delinquencies to avoid the embarrassment of having
their name publicly listed.”); Press Release, Div. of Revenue, Dep’t of Finance, State of
Del., Online List of Delinquent Delaware Taxpayers Paying Off (Sept. 6, 2007), available
at http://revenue.delaware.gov/services/press/07_release_onlinesuccess.pdf (quoting Dela-
ware representative who sponsored legislation creating the program as concluding that the
“social pressure” from public posting of the names of delinquent taxpayers “was worth the
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these officials, the mere threat of shaming sanctions often leads delin-
quent taxpayers, whose whereabouts had previously been a mystery,
to pay some of their outstanding tax liability.111  As one state revenue
representative described this reaction from previously delinquent tax-
payers, “once their minister, their next door neighbor, brother,
friends, all of them know about [their unpaid taxes], they’re much
more amenable to paying what they owe.”112
Proponents of extending shaming sanctions to corporate tax partici-
pants imply that publicity of a corporation’s use of tax shelters could
result in similar reputational harm to the corporation.113  As I discuss
below, however, there is little evidence to suggest that publicity of a
corporation’s abusive tax activity actually would cause it to suffer
reputational harm.  Rather, past community reaction to media reports
that particular corporations had engaged in tax shelters implies that
shaming sanctions for corporate tax abuse may not pose credible
threats to the social standing and reputations of corporations.
1. Past Community Reaction
In past cases where shareholders, consumers, and business partners
have learned that a corporation reduced its federal taxes by using a
tax shelter, the corporation did not suffer visible communal ostracism.
This result stands in stark contrast to the community reaction that has
followed publicity of taxpayers’ failures to pay their outstanding taxes
or file their tax returns.
Upon learning that a particular corporation used aggressive tax
strategies to claim tax benefits, shareholders, consumers, and employ-
ees have not shunned the corporation for displaying, in Senator
Grassley’s words, “clouded business ethics.”114  There are no reports,
for example, that when Black & Decker’s litigation with the federal
government revealed that the corporation had used the contingent lia-
effort” and the “success of this program has been outstanding”); Wyatt, note 59 (quoting R
South Carolina Department of Revenue official as stating that “to have your neighbors be
able to see your [tax] debt, that would be embarrassing of course, and that’s the whole
idea”).
111 Lydia Quarles, Recouping Delinquent Taxes:  Does “Shame” Work?, Tech. Brief
(Stennis Inst. of Gov’t., Miss. State Univ.), Mar., 2007, at 1-2, available at  http://www.sig.
msstate.edu/modules/cms/images/thumb/169.pdf  (reporting that in Wisconsin, in the time
between its mailing of warning letters to delinquent taxpayers and the first use of the Web-
site of Shame, less than two months, over 900 delinquent taxpayers agreed to pay an aggre-
gate of more than $8 million in outstanding tax liability).
112 Wyatt, note 59 (quoting spokesman for Louisiana Department of Revenue). R
113 See, e.g., Soled & Ventry, note 67.  Indeed, the authors have advocated simultane- R
ously for the implementation of a shaming program for tax delinquents at the federal level.
See id.
114 Grassley, note 77. R
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bility tax shelter to reduce its federal taxes, the corporation’s stock
priced plunged dramatically or that shareholders demanded manage-
ment resignations or that any consumer, even the most tax knowl-
edgeable, opted against purchasing a DustBuster in protest of its
maker.115
Michelle Hanlon and Joel Slemrod recently found that tax shelter
publicity does not lead to drops in the corporation’s stock price as
significant as those following public reports of financial accounting
fraud.116  Hanlon and Slemrod also found that “firms with relatively
high disclosed cash effective tax rates have a less negative [stock price]
reaction, consistent with the market reacting positively to evidence
that these firms were not as ‘tax-passive’ as previously believed.”117
Put differently, the market may interpret news of tax shelter activity
by a corporation with a high effective tax rate as a “positive signal of
tax aggressiveness.”118  Similarly, another commentator has noted that
on the day that the U.S. Tax Court affirmed that Colgate-Palmolive
had engaged in a tax shelter, Colgate-Palmolive’s stock price rose and
continued to rise throughout the next week.119
Future and current shareholders of a corporation may view its par-
ticipation in tax shelters very differently from instances in which the
corporation fails to disclose pertinent details about its business plan or
engages in deceptive financial accounting practices.  As journalist
Alan Murray once wrote, “Lying to the IRS doesn’t generate the same
public outrage as lying to shareholders.”120  When a corporation with-
holds important information from its shareholders that may enable
them to value and make investment decisions regarding their stock in
the corporation, shareholders may criticize the corporation’s manag-
ers as directly threatening their economic interests.  By contrast, out-
witting the Service may be interpreted as furthering shareholders’
interests.
The high reputational cost that policymakers have implied would
accompany a shaming sanction for corporate tax abuse would be un-
likely to materialize in practice.  Although managers may fear that tax
115 For discussion of public reaction to Black & Decker’s legal victory, see Marie Leone,
Courts and Torts:  Tax-Shelter Shocker, CFO.com, Dec. 21, 2004, available at http://www.
cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/3515229.
116 Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence
from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. Pub. Econ. 126,
128 (2009).
117 Id. at 127.
118 Id. at 139.
119 Jonathan M. Prokup, Down with Disclosure, 8 J. Tax Prac. & Proc. 27, 31 (Apr.-May
2006).
120 Alan Murray, Inflated Profits in Corporate Books Is Half the Story, Wall St. J., July
2, 2002, at A4.
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shelter publicity would impose reputational costs on their corpora-
tions, if past community reaction is an accurate guide, this fear seems
to be exaggerated.  If shaming sanctions were implemented, it is prob-
able that corporate managers would quickly recognize the lack of
reputational risk the sanctions pose to their corporations.  Conse-
quently, the value of the adverse reputational cost from tax shelter
publicity would probably be too small to deter rational managers from
pursuing aggressive tax positions.
2. Possible Explanations
Why have corporations not suffered greater drops in stock price,
consumer backlash, and criticism from business partners in response
to public reports that they have utilized tax shelters to reduce their tax
burden?  Below, I consider several possible explanations.
No Observable Social Harm.  Perhaps community members do not
express moral outrage upon hearing news of corporations’ use of tax
shelters because they cannot readily observe the social harm that this
activity causes.  When a corporation spills oily wastewater into a lake
or knowingly distributes toxic toothpaste, interest groups quickly mo-
bilize the community to boycott the corporation’s products and call
for the government to levy hefty monetary sanctions.121  The commu-
nity may respond differently to publicity of corporate tax abuse be-
cause the activity does not appear to create social harm as visible as
other types of corporate malfeasance.
This explanation, however, is unpersuasive.  Individuals operate
within household budget constraints and probably understand that the
government does as well.  When a corporation employs a tax shelter
to reduce its tax payments in ways that Congress never anticipated,
the government may be forced to raise tax rates on all other taxpay-
ers.122  It would be naı̈ve to assume that laypeople cannot understand
the connection between corporate tax abuse and the government’s
budgetary constraints.
Politicians who rally against corporate tax abuse frequently high-
light this connection.  While introducing the legislation that would
have required the Service to publicize the names of corporate tax shel-
ter participants, Senator Norm Coleman, for example, commented of
121 See Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, 57 Disp. Resol. J. 26, 31-
32 (May-July 2002) (describing public reaction to Exxon, United Airlines, and Firestone
harms).
122 See Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters:  The Problem, Possible
Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 388 (2002)  (“Congress
did not set current tax rates with the expectation that tax liability would be artificially
reduced through the use of tax shelters.”).
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corporate tax abuse, “[t]his is not a victimless crime.  It is not the Gov-
ernment that loses the money.  It is the people of America, average
working families who will bear the brunt of lost revenue . . .”123  Sena-
tor Charles Grassley has further implied that corporate tax abuse is
unpatriotic because it may deprive the government of funds needed to
protect itself, stating,
Now here you have 3,000 Americans killed on September 11
. . . Then you have these big accounting firms marketing
these tax shelters. . .telling people:  You are going to forget
all about that when you see your new earnings report.  Cor-
porations like that ought to get their heart into America or
get their rear end out because what this country is all about
is pulling together, particularly now in time of war.124
Such frequent public discussion of the effects of corporate tax abuse
on tax rates and the funding of important federal programs weakens
the claim that the community is unaware of the social harm that this
activity causes.  The lack of observable social harm, therefore, does
not adequately explain why members of corporations’ communities do
not ostracize corporations that pursue tax shelters.
Subject Matter Disinterest.  Another possible explanation for the
community’s lack of hostility toward corporate tax shelter participants
is that consumers, investors, and business partners are simply uninter-
ested in the subject matter.  Corporate tax shelters are incredibly com-
plex by design125 and so it is understandable that news of a large
corporation’s tax shelter might attract the attention of only tax law-
yers and accountants.  Compared to images of slicked ducklings navi-
gating a corporation’s oil spill or reports of toddlers injured by
defective toy trains, corporate tax abuse may fail to capture the com-
munity’s attention.  As a result, some may argue, tax shelter publicity
results in apathy from members of corporations’ communities.
This explanation for the community’s lack of hostility toward corpo-
rate tax shelter participants is also unpersuasive.  Since the peak of the
tax shelter boom in the late 1990’s, there has been marked public in-
terest in this topic.  Popular newspapers and periodicals have pub-
lished prominent reports on the specific details of high-profile
123 150 Cong. Rec. S. 5191, 5216 (May 11, 2004) (statement of Sen. Coleman).
124 150 Cong. Rec. S. 4737, 4740 (May 3, 2004) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
125 See Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Bus-
iness Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 47,
49 (2001) (“In [tax shelter] transactions, an elaborate series of formal steps is contrived to
lead to an unreasonably beneficial tax result, usually resulting from some defect or ambigu-
ity in the tax law.”)
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corporate tax shelters.126  David Cay Johnston’s exposé of corporate
tax shelters and other forms of tax avoidance, Perfectly Legal,127
quickly became a New York Times best seller.128  Several television
programs, such as PBS’s Frontline and MSNBC’s The Rachel Maddow
Show, have featured in-depth programs explaining the details of cor-
porate tax abuse129 in terms that are “understandable and relevant to
a general audience.”130  The explanation that the community fails to
react negatively to corporations that pursue tax shelters as a result of
disinterest in this topic, therefore, is also unconvincing.
Violations of Tax Standards, Not Tax Rules.  A promising explana-
tion for the absence of communal ostracism in response to corporate
tax abuse publicity is that the community of consumers, shareholders,
and business partners do not view tax avoidance activities that fail to
violate explicit tax rules as inconsistent with shared moral norms.  By
contrast, when the community perceives that a taxpayer has violated a
clear tax rule in place at the time of the taxpayer’s action, it may react
to this perception with significantly more hostility.
The community appears to perceive tax planning, whether by indi-
viduals or corporations, as a game in which the objective is to claim
tax positions that yield the greatest tax benefits without breaching any
explicit tax rules.131  If a taxpayer claims a tax position that is not pro-
hibited by tax rules and the taxing authority does not challenge the
taxpayer’s position, the community appears to view the taxpayer as
winning the tax planning game.  If the taxing authority, however, re-
views the taxpayer’s tax position and determines that it fails to satisfy
tax standards such as the economic substance doctrine, the community
may view the taxpayer as losing the tax planning game, but at least as
having played it fairly.
126 The general public has learned about corporate tax shelters from newspapers as va-
ried as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Post.  See, e.g., Jonathan Weil, Ernst &
Young Faces Tax-Shelter Inquiry, Wall St. J., May 24, 2004 at C1; Janet Whitman, Feds Hit
E&Y 4 in Tax Shelter Fraud, N.Y. Post, May 31, 2007, at 40.
127 David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal:  The Covert Campaign to Rig Our Tax System
to Benefit the Super Rich-and Cheat Everybody Else (2003).
128 The New York Times Best Seller List–March 21, 2004, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2004, at
18.
129 Frontline:  Tax Me if You Can (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2003), transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/; The Rachel Maddow Show, Inter-
view with Austan Goolsbee (MSNBC television broadcast May 4, 2009), transcript availa-
ble at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30641410/.
130 Hedrick Smith, Frontline:  Tax Me If You Can, washingtonpost.com (Feb. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38516-2003Dec29?language=
printer (online discussion with producer of documentary).
131 I thank Deborah Schenk for helpful discussion of this point.  Reporters in the popu-
lar press frequently refer to the problem of corporate tax abuse as a “game.”  See, e.g.,
Mike France, The Rise of the Wall Street Tax Machine, Bus. Wk., Mar. 31, 2003, at 84
(containing references to the “shelter game”).
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This analogy helps to explain the community’s past reaction to news
that particular corporations have engaged in tax shelters.  In newspa-
per articles and editorials describing the tax shelters of well-known
corporations, reporters often refer to the corporations’ exploitation of
“loopholes” in the corporate tax law.132  This characterization of cor-
porate tax abuse implies that the community recognizes that corpora-
tions do not violate clear tax rules when they engage in tax shelters.
Instead, the community seems to recognize that a corporation has
taken advantage of a particular reading of the Code with which the
Service or Congress disagrees after the fact.  A “loophole,” after all, is
“an ambiguity or omission in the text through which the intent of a
statute, contract, or obligation may be evaded.”133  Because corpora-
tions do not violate explicit tax rules when they claim tax benefits that
take advantage of such an “ambiguity or omission” in the corporate
tax law, the community may not consider typical occurrences of cor-
porate tax abuse as worthy of moral condemnation.
On the other hand, when a taxpayer violates an explicit tax rule,
such as the legal obligation to pay outstanding tax liability or the re-
quirement to file a federal income tax return,134 the community may
not consider the taxpayer as having played the tax planning game
fairly at all.  For example, the community may react harshly toward an
individual or local business when its name appears on a state’s tax
delinquency shaming website, in part because the community consid-
ers the taxpayer to have flagrantly ignored a clear tax rule requiring it
to pay assessed state taxes on time.  When the Wisconsin State Jour-
nal, for example, described delinquent taxpayers appearing on the
state’s Website of Shame as “scofflaws,” it used that term to refer im-
plicitly to the rule-based nature of the taxpayers’ offense.135  A “scoff-
law” literally is “a contemptuous lawbreaker.”136
132 See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, IBM’s Under-the-Wire Tax Break, Wall St. J., June 7,
2007, at A3 (referring to IBM’s use of aggressive tax structure as “loophole”).
133 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1335 (1961).
134 IRC § 6072(a).
135 See Editorial, Wis. St. J., Keep Pressure on Tax Scofflaws, Dec. 27, 2006, at A8,
available at  http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-156443859/editorial-keep-pres-
sure-tax.html. Similar communal reaction often follows news that an elected or appointed
political official has failed to file tax returns or pay delinquent taxes.  For example, in 2008,
Charles O’Byrne, a top aide to New York Governor David Paterson, explained his failure
to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in outstanding tax liability as resulting from “late-
filing syndrome.”  See Nicholas Confessore & Jeremy W. Peters, Governor’s Aide Had
“Late-Filing Syndrome,” Lawyer Says, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2008, at A27.  In response to
O’Byrne’s public explanation, the New York Post published an editorial, in which its edito-
rial board stated “Maybe [Governor] Paterson trusts him.  But there is no reason for the
rest of New York to do so.  Not at all.  How long before that distrust rubs off on Paterson?”
Editorial, N.Y. Post, Taxing Credibility, Oct. 23, 2008, at 36.
136 Webster’s, note 133, at 2034. R
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Revenue agencies in states that have adopted shaming websites
have acknowledged the importance of emphasizing to the community
that individual and business taxpayers that are subject to shaming
sanctions have failed to abide by a clear obligation to pay state taxes
on time by explaining on their websites that the taxpayers featured
have ignored multiple warnings to pay outstanding tax liability and
that none of them is attempting to satisfy a portion of the outstanding
liability.137  One state revenue official has theorized that state tax de-
linquency shaming websites are effective because the community un-
derstands that featured taxpayers “just flat out owe us the money and
won’t pay it!”138
If the government were to attempt to shame corporations publicly
for participating in tax shelters that were not explicitly prohibited in
advance by clear statutory tax rules, corporations would likely deflect
communal ostracism by highlighting for the community the distinction
between corporate tax abuse and acts that represent clear violations
of tax rules.  For example, if shaming sanctions were in effect at the
time that Black & Decker pursued its contingent liability transaction,
a tax strategy that was not explicitly prohibited in advance,139 Black &
Decker could have turned to a number of options to deflect commu-
nity outrage, if any, that a shaming sanction for this activity might
produce.  Black & Decker’s management, for example, could have is-
sued a press release making a statement such as the following: “While
the Service has determined that Black & Decker has claimed tax ben-
efits that were inappropriate, Black & Decker violated no law in the
Code or elsewhere at the time it filed its tax return.”
Such statements could persuade the community that Black &
Decker simply played the tax planning game and lost, but that it was
not the type of corporation that would intentionally cheat at the tax
planning game by ignoring clear tax rules.  In 2007, the Blackstone
Group, for example, issued a similar press release in response to a
front-page article in The New York Times that implied that its tax
treatment of its initial public offering was abusive.140
A potential response to this analysis is that if the government were
to implement shaming sanctions against corporations that have pur-
137 See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, note 54. R
138 See Steven Walters, A New Weapon Against Tax Dodgers: Shame, Mil. J. Sentinel,
Dec. 18, 2003, at 01A (quoting spokesman for Louisiana Department of Revenue).
139 See note 20 and accompanying text. R
140 Press Release, The Blackstone Group, Blackstone Says The New York Times Inaccu-
rate and Misleading (July 13, 2007), available at http://www.blackstone.com/news/press_
releases/07-13-2007.pdf (“Blackstone is not in any way taking advantage of tax loopholes,
but rather is using a standard tax method used widely by private and public companies
when business assets are sold.”).
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sued abusive tax shelters, the community’s perception of this activity
would change.  Put differently, shaming would “legitimate,”141 in the
eyes of the community, the government’s claim that corporate tax
abuse is socially harmful.  This argument is questionable for two rea-
sons.  First, to explain clearly the government’s position regarding cor-
porate tax shelters to the community, a massive public education
campaign would be needed regarding the applicable judicial tax stan-
dards, such as the economic substance and business purpose doctrines.
Such a broad education campaign has not yet occurred.  Second, de-
spite the logical attractiveness of the response that shaming sanctions
may change perceptions of corporate tax abuse, sociologists and legal
scholars have yet to confirm that shaming sanctions or legal institu-
tions are capable of creating or changing shared moral norms.142
In light of the community’s perception of corporate tax shelters as
legitimate moves in the game of tax planning, its potential for expres-
sing moral outrage toward corporations that would be subject to
shaming sanctions would likely be limited.
B. Positive Signal
In addition to failing to provoke communal ostracism, a shaming
sanction for corporate tax abuse could have the ironic effect of emit-
ting a positive signal to key members of the corporation’s commu-
nity–investors.  As I discuss below, shaming sanctions for corporate
tax abuse could signal to the investing community that the shamed
corporation has a tax director who is willing to “push the envelope”
by claiming tax benefits for his corporation that rely on strict construc-
tionist interpretations of the tax rules in the Code.  Investors could
consider this behavior to be an attractive attribute of a corporation
because it could increase the economic return on their investments in
the corporation’s stock.  The potentially positive signal that a shaming
sanction for corporate tax abuse could release further diminishes the
potential ability of this sanction to deter corporate managers from
pursuing abusive tax shelters.
141 See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L.
Rev. 2379, for criticism of the theory of “legitimation.”
142 See id.  (“[S]tudies show that the public has little awareness of courts, thinks poorly
of the few judicial decisions of which it has knowledge, and, most importantly, cares much
more about the substantive value of a legal decision than its legal form or pedigree.  As a
result it is difficult to support the idea that legal behavior contributes to public obedience
irrespective of the substantive norms advanced.”)
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1. Pushing the Envelope
A shaming sanction for corporate tax abuse would emit a very dif-
ferent signal to investors than a shaming sanction for a violation of an
explicit tax rule.  Publicity that a corporation failed to pay its taxes,
file its tax return, or disclose specifically requested information to the
Service would likely send negative signals to investors.  If a corpora-
tion had blatantly violated tax rules requiring it to file a tax return or
provide certain documents to the Service, investors could be con-
cerned that the corporation also may fail to comply with rules that
require it to deliver pertinent information to them, such as accurate
earnings reports and detailed information about future business plans.
Alternatively, investors could view a corporation that does not follow
explicit tax rules as an unorganized operation with incompetent
managers.
If the Service were to publicize that it had settled with a large cor-
poration as a result of its participation in an abusive tax shelter or
require the corporation to publicize its payment of monetary tax shel-
ter penalties, investors would understand that the corporation would
not be entitled to claim tax benefits using the particular transaction
that triggered the shaming sanction.  Yet at the same time, the sham-
ing sanction could signal that this corporation’s tax director was will-
ing to claim risky tax positions that could generate substantial benefits
for investors in the future.  As a result of the tax director’s willingness
to rely on hyper-technical readings of the Code to achieve these re-
sults, a shaming sanction could bear closer resemblance to a “red
badge of courage”143 than to a “scarlet letter.”144
Investors often comment that they do not seek to invest in corpora-
tions whose tax directors break the tax law, but rather that claim tax
positions that “push the envelope.”145  Much like a test pilot performs
aeronautical maneuvers that barely avoid crossing critical safety
thresholds, when a tax director pushes the envelope, he claims tax po-
sitions that technically appear to comply with the tax rules of the
Code.  Investors may respect this type of tax director for pursuing ag-
gressive tax positions that yield economic returns on their invest-
ments, but refrain from violating explicit tax rules.
What type of investors might be attracted to corporations whose tax
directors claim abusive tax positions?  Investors who are most con-
143 Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of Courage (Prestwick House, 2004) (1895).
144 Hawthorne, note 91. R
145 See Nanette Byrnes & Louis Lavelle, The Corporate Tax Game, Bus. Wk., Mar. 31,
2003, at 78 (discussing corporate tax directors’ “willingness to push the envelope”).  Best-
selling author Tom Wolfe first introduced this term to the general public.  See Tom Wolfe,
The Right Stuff 8 (1979).
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cerned with their short-term economic return from owning a corpora-
tion’s stock may be especially interested in discovering which
corporations have aggressive tax directors.  Hedge funds and private
equity funds, for example, have purchased significant stakes in the
stock of blue chip corporations.146  Many of these funds seek to maxi-
mize the economic return on their investment within a relatively short
period of time147 and may not be concerned that a corporation partici-
pates in a transaction that the Service subsequently rejects as a tax
shelter.  These short-term investors may enjoy a corporation’s claimed
tax benefits today; years later, when the Service audits and rejects the
corporation’s tax position, they no longer own stock in the
corporation.148
The use of shaming sanctions for corporate tax abuse could supply
these short-term investors with an unintended, but valuable roadmap.
Hedge fund and private equity fund managers spend significant time
searching for information about corporate managers’ tax planning be-
havior, insight that may not be readily apparent to the market.149
During my research, one manager of a multi-billion hedge fund com-
mented to me that “it can be a plus if a public company’s tax director
takes risks.  Learning whether a company has a risk-taking tax direc-
tor plays a role in analyzing the investment.”150  Another prominent
fund manager explained, “it would be beneficial if we had a way to
find companies whose tax directors and lawyers are at the cutting edge
of tax management.”151
Tax directors may discount any reputational harm of tax shelter
publicity to their corporations as a result of the positive reaction of
short-term investors like hedge and private equity firms in response to
this information.  The potentially positive signal of shaming sanctions
for corporate tax abuse, therefore, may further diminish the deter-
rence value of this form of punishment.
2. Increased Economic Returns
Several factors explain why investors may have a favorable reaction
to news that a corporation engages in aggressive tax strategies.
146 See Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, Bus. Wk., Feb. 20,
2006, at 72 (discussing hedge fund investment in blue chip corporations).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id; see also Ananth Madhavan, Implementation of Hedge Fund Strategies, in Hedge
Fund Strategies, A Global Outlook 74 (2002).
150 Interview with Hedge Fund A Manager (Jan. 28, 2007).
151 Interview with Hedge Fund B Manager (Jan. 29, 2007).
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At the most basic level, aggressive tax strategies enable a corpora-
tion to drive down its effective tax rate.152  While the top federal statu-
tory corporate tax rate is 35%,153 most corporations strive to pay a
much lower effective tax rate.154   A reduced corporate tax burden
may enable a corporation to pursue business ventures that corpora-
tions with higher effective tax rates may not be able to afford.  A re-
duced effective tax rate may also enable a corporation to distribute
dividends to shareholders and still fund its operations.155
A corporation’s effective tax rate also plays a significant role in the
market’s valuation of the corporation and its stock.156  If a corporation
can engage in tax shelters, it can enjoy tax losses that reduce its taxa-
ble income, but that do not actually result in real economic losses.  As
a result, the corporation’s “book income” for financial accounting
purposes, as well as its calculation of financial earnings of the corpora-
tion per share of its outstanding stock, will remain steady.  The earn-
ings per share figure for any public corporation is considered a
measure of the corporation’s profitability and directly affects the price
of the corporation’s stock.157
Aggressive tax strategies also enable a corporation to borrow less
money from third-party lenders in order to finance operations.  If a
corporation can pursue an aggressive tax strategy successfully, it can
use the value of the tax benefits in place of borrowed cash.158  A 2006
study by John Graham and Alan Tucker confirmed that the corpora-
tions involved in the major tax shelter cases over the last decade bor-
rowed significantly less money than other corporations.159  According
to the study, if the corporations that used tax shelters had instead at-
tempted to borrow funds from third-party lenders, the borrowings
would have required corporations to borrow such large amounts that
their debt ratios would have approached 90% of their asset values,
“an unheard-of number.”160  Tax shelter activity enables a corporation
152 See Treasury Dep’t, note 1, at 14. R
153 IRC § 11(a).
154 See Treasury Dep’t, note 1, at 14. R
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 The “earnings per share” figure is calculated by dividing the net earnings of a corpo-
ration by the average number of shares of its common stock outstanding during a particu-
lar period.
158 See John R. Graham & Alan L. Tucker, Tax Shelters and Corporate Debt Policy, 81
J. Fin. Econ. 563, 563 (2006) (concluding that firms in sample “use less debt when they
engage in tax sheltering”).
159 Id. at 563 (“Compared to companies with similar pre-shelter debt ratios, the debt
ratios of firms engaged in tax shelters fall by about 8%.”).
160 Press Release, Duke University, New Study Sheds Light on Corporate Tax Shelters
(Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://www.pace.edu/News/read.cfm?forum=9&id=422&
thread=361.
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to finance operations in ways that may not adversely affect its credit
rating from third-party ratings agencies or otherwise cause it to ap-
pear credit risky to investors.161
A shaming sanction for corporate tax abuse, thus, would reveal to
investors that a corporation may have a tax director who may engage
in tax strategies that reduce the corporation’s effective tax rate and
enable the corporation to avoid excessive third-party borrowing.
C. Low Risk of Personal Loss
It is possible that tax directors could be deterred by the threat of
shaming sanctions because they would worry that they could suffer
personal loss if their corporations’ abusive tax activities were exposed
publicly.  In recent years, the federal government has successfully pur-
sued criminal tax evasion charges against accountants and tax lawyers
who marketed abusive tax shelters to corporations.162  When consider-
ing these developments, an understandable inference may be that tax
directors may fear that tax shelter publicity resulting from a shaming
sanction could lead senior management to terminate their employ-
ment as a way to absolve the corporations publicly of tax shelter
involvement.
Despite the possibility that some tax directors may perceive that
they would suffer personal losses if their corporations’ abusive tax ac-
tivities were revealed publicly, the justification for this anxiety is
weak.  First, in contrast to the adverse consequences that individual
promoters of corporate tax abuse have recently faced as a result of
criminal prosecution, individual users of tax shelter products do not
appear to have suffered similar consequences as a result of tax shelter
publicity.  Second, as noted above, by the time the Service discovers a
corporation’s participation in a tax shelter, the tax director that origi-
nally authorized it may no longer be affiliated with the corporation.
Accordingly, although some tax directors could become apprehen-
sive over the threat of shaming sanctions for corporate tax abuse in
the short term, over time, they should realize that they have little to
fear from tax shelter publicity.
161 When determining a corporation’s creditworthiness, bond ratings agencies consider
the amount of debt for which a corporation is liable.  See, e.g., Standard & Poor’s, Corpo-
rate Ratings Criteria 2006, at 45-60 (2006), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.
com/spf/pdf/products/corporateratings_2006_corp.pdf.
162 In 2008, a federal jury convicted two KPMG accountants and a former tax lawyer
from a major New York law firm of criminal tax evasion charges stemming from the mar-
keting of abusive tax shelter products.  See Lynnley Browning, 3 Convicted in KPMG Tax
Shelter Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2008, at B11.  In 2005, KPMG itself avoided criminal
prosecution for tax shelter activities by entering into a $456 million settlement agreement
with the federal government.  Id.
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1. Past Professional Consequences
In contrast to the termination of chief executive officers and other
corporate managers following news of financial accounting misre-
porting,163 there is an absence of evidence of similar treatment of tax
directors that authorized tax strategies that the Service or courts re-
jected as abusive tax shelters.
It is even possible that some employers may be attracted to hiring
tax professionals who have demonstrated a willingness to engage in
aggressive tax planning.  A tax director’s association with a corpora-
tion that has pursued tax shelters is unlikely to taint his professional
reputation, and indeed, could even enhance it.  For example, despite
the publicity of Enron’s abusive financial and tax accounting practices
in the late 1990’s, other banks and trading firms have actively sought
to hire the individuals who were employed by Enron.164  Market insid-
ers have described employers’ attraction to individuals who engaged
in such aggressive behavior on behalf of their former company as the
“Enron mystique.”165
Corporate tax abuse is distinct from tax shelter activity that benefits
individual managers personally.  When Sprint executives authorized a
tax shelter that allowed them to defer their personal tax liability on
over $200 million of income resulting from the exercise of options, for
instance, the board of directors questioned the motivation for their
acts.166  Despite the executives’ contention to the contrary,167 the
Sprint board of directors viewed these executives as subjecting the
corporation to adverse publicity without providing real tax benefits to
the corporation.  As a result, the board forced the two executives to
resign.168  If the primary purpose of this tax shelter had been to bene-
fit Sprint rather than the individuals who authorized it, on the other
hand, perhaps the executives would not have suffered such profes-
sional consequences.
163 See Harris, note 103, at 5. R
164 See Ann Davis, Trading on the Enron Mystique; Veterans Flourish, Capitalizing on
Links to Innovative Giant, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 2006, at C1.
165 Id.
166 See Rebecca Blumenstein, Sprint Forced Out Top Executives over Questionable Tax
Shelter, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 2003, at A1.
167 See id.  The executives’ rationale was that if they had been required to pay tax on the
income resulting from their stock option exercises, they might have had to sell some of the
Sprint shares in order to settle their hefty tax bills.  Sales of Sprint stock by the leaders of
the company, they argued, could harm the stock market’s confidence in Sprint and result in
a decrease in the market value of all Sprint stock.  Id.
168 See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Takes Aim at Big Shelters and Hopes Message Fil-
ters Down, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2003, at A1 (describing Sprint management resignations).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1365888
\\server05\productn\T\TAX\62-4\TAX403.txt unknown Seq: 35 20-OCT-09 15:38
2009] CORPORATE TAX ABUSE 575
2. Tax Shelter Time Lag
Another reason to question the potential for shaming sanctions to
cause tax directors to alter their behavior as a result of concern for
personal consequences is that the Service may not discover a corpora-
tion’s tax shelter until significant time has elapsed from the tax year
when the corporation used it to claim tax benefits.169  This result may
be the case even when a corporation described the details of the tax
position on its tax return and complied with the Service’s vast disclo-
sure requirements.  In the case of Black & Decker’s contingent liabil-
ity tax shelter, for example, six years passed from the year in which
the corporation claimed its large tax loss and the year when the Ser-
vice challenged the loss in a notice of deficiency.170  As former Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue Charles Rossotti once remarked to his
audit teams, “You’re not in the audit business.  You’re in the archeol-
ogy business.”171
The primary obstacle that auditors face in their search for tax shel-
ters is that they do not necessarily know what they are looking for in
advance.  When a taxpayer simply fails to file a tax return or pay as-
sessed taxes that are due and undisputed, the taxing authority can
quickly detect this act of noncompliance with clear tax rules (as long
as it is aware of the taxpayer’s existence).  The typical corporate tax
shelter, by contrast, may not be readily apparent to auditors because it
may appear to be an ordinary business transaction that complies with
the literal tax rules of the Code.  Auditors, accordingly, must unearth
significant factual information about a particular tax position before
they can determine whether it satisfies tax standards like the eco-
nomic substance or business purpose requirements.172  Further, the
Service’s practice of requesting that large corporations voluntarily ex-
tend the relevant statute of limitations only exacerbates the tax shelter
time lag.173  And in cases where a corporation does not disclose its
169 See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers:  The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 Yale J. on Reg. 77, 87 (2006) (commenting on the “lengthy time lag” between
the execution of a tax shelter and its eventual detection by the Service).
170 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp.2d 621, 622-23 (D. Md. 2004).
171 David Cay Johnston, Agents Say Fast Audits Hurt I.R.S., N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2007,
at C6 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti).
172 See Cliff Jernigan, Corporate Tax Audit Survival 79-84 (2005) (describing audit pro-
cess for large corporations).
173 See id.  Suggestions that the Service “speed up” audits of large corporations have
faced a barrage of criticism from current and former IRS officials.  See Jonathan Weisman,
IRS Speeds Corporate Tax Audits, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 2003, at A1.  These officials claim
that a strategy of accelerated audits could cause IRS auditors to “miss tax dodges and fail
to explore suspicious transactions.”  Id. (quoting former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Wil-
liams, Jr.).  Some tax shelter time lag, thus, appears to be inevitable.
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participation in a listed transaction, the statute of limitations may
never expire.174
The considerable tax shelter time lag could dramatically reduce, if
not eliminate, concerns of tax directors that shaming sanctions could
cause them to suffer indirect personal loss.  To appreciate this effect of
the tax shelter time lag, consider the following example:  Assume the
Service is required by law to publicize, using its website and other
media, any instance in which a corporation pays a monetary tax pen-
alty to the Service for engaging in a transaction that lacks economic
substance (a tax shelter).  The tax director of Blue Chip Co., a Fortune
500 corporation, is considering entering an extremely aggressive tax
strategy with a code name of “LOOT” (“Low Odds of Tax”)175 that
would enable Blue Chip Co. to offset hundreds of millions of dollars
of taxable corporate income with a large current tax deduction.  Be-
cause the LOOT tax strategy appears to comply with the literal words
of the Code and does not violate any administrative prohibitions, as-
sume that the Service would not detect Blue Chip Co.’s use of LOOT,
levy a tax shelter penalty against Blue Chip Co., and then publicize
this event until at least seven years have elapsed.
For Blue Chip Co.’s tax director, the time lag could reduce concern
that he would suffer personal consequences by authorizing the use of
the tax strategy.  In the intervening seven years before the Service’s
imposition of a shaming sanction against Blue Chip Co. for its use of
LOOT, Blue Chip Co.’s tax director could retire or transition to an-
other corporation.  The tax shelter time lag makes it unlikely that this
tax director would lose his job in response to adverse publicity result-
ing from a shaming sanction.  The potential for the Service to subject
Blue Chip Co. to a shaming sanction for engaging in abusive tax activ-
ity, therefore, should not deter its tax director from the pursuit of
LOOT.
IV. HOW SHAMING COULD WEAKEN TAX COMPLIANCE
Shaming sanctions, as I have argued, would be unlikely to deter cor-
porate managers from pursuing abusive tax shelters. Admittedly, my
analysis depends on future predictions of behavior, using past re-
sponses to tax shelter publicity and the application of shaming sanc-
174 IRC § 6501(c)(10).
175 Many of the tax shelters that accounting firms and others have promoted have simi-
lar code names, such as “COBRA,” an acronym for “Currency Options Bring Reward
Alternatives.”  See U.S. Tax Shelter Industry:  The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and
Financial Professionals:  Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 286, 8 (2003), available at http://www.
quatloos.com/TAXSHELTERREPORTFINAL.pdf.
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tions in other tax contexts as a guide.  As a result, it is possible that
one could conclude that there would be no harm in merely experi-
menting with shaming sanctions to measure their deterrence
capabilities.
The defects of applying shaming sanctions in the context of corpo-
rate tax abuse, however, are not limited to their inefficacy.  In addi-
tion to failing to achieve deterrence objectives, the use of shaming
sanctions also could result in several unintended consequences.  As I
discuss in the following Section, the use of shaming sanctions against
corporations that pursue tax shelters could cause conservative tax di-
rectors to perceive that abusive tax planning is rampant and, in turn,
could incentivize them to claim more aggressive tax positions, could
provoke backlash from tax directors and the general taxpaying public,
and could encourage corporations’ managers to resort to the courts to
challenge the Service’s characterizations of particular transactions as
tax shelters rather than accept public brandings from the Service as
tax shelter participants.
A. The Chump Effect
A perverse effect of publicly shaming corporations that participate
in abusive tax shelters is that some corporate tax directors could re-
spond to these sanctions by increasing their use of aggressive tax plan-
ning techniques.  As a result of publicity that well-known, respected
corporations have authorized the use of abusive tax shelters, con-
servative tax directors could develop the impression that their historic
tax reporting practices have been too cautious.  In response, these tax
directors may alter their compliance with the tax law by increasing
their use of aggressive corporate tax strategies.  This reaction would
be consistent with reciprocity theory, which attempts to explain why
actors cooperate in collective action settings.176  Below, I briefly dis-
cuss reciprocity theory as it relates to tax compliance and then hypoth-
esize possible responses of certain tax directors to publicity that well-
known, respected corporations have authorized the use of abusive tax
shelters.
176 For discussion of reciprocity theory, see Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equal-
ity Passé?  Homo Reciprocans and the Future of Egalitarian Politics (1998), available at
http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/isinequa.pdf; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Reci-
procity and Economics:  The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 Eur. Econ.
Rev. 845 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity:  Trust, Collective Action and
Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003).
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1. Reciprocity Theory and Tax Compliance
Reciprocity theory posits that an actor will contribute toward a pub-
lic good only if he perceives that others are reciprocating his good
behavior.177  If the actor develops a perception that others are not
contributing, but are, instead, free-riding, he may reduce his own con-
tributions.178  Reciprocity theory is relevant to any examination of tax
compliance.  Because some taxpayers may ignore their tax compliance
obligations, yet enjoy the government benefits that compliant taxpay-
ers fund, compliance with the tax system represents the model collec-
tive action problem.
Some adherents of reciprocity theory have argued that the use of
shaming sanctions to punish tax evaders may cause taxpayers that cor-
rectly and timely pay their tax liabilities to reduce their own tax com-
pliance.  Dan Kahan, for example, has theorized that if the
government were to reveal publicly that many taxpayers had failed to
comply with their obligation to file tax returns or pay the proper
amounts of tax, it could cause compliant taxpayers to assume that
“more taxpayers than they thought are choosing to cheat.”179  As
Kahan notes, individuals may comply with the tax law when they per-
ceive that others are paying their taxes,180 but may reduce their own
compliance if they perceive that tax cheating is rampant.181  No one
wants to feel like a “chump” for paying taxes while others cheat.182
Other scholars, however, have criticized this analysis, contending
that shaming as a means of tax enforcement could alleviate, rather
than exacerbate, the chump effect.  In contrast to Kahan’s characteri-
zation, Stephen Mazza has defended the use of shaming sanctions to
punish taxpayers that fail to comply with the tax system because it
may enable the government to bolster public confidence in the taxing
authority’s ability to detect, punish, and deter abuse.183  According to
Mazza, by implementing shaming sanctions in the tax compliance con-
text, the taxing authority may “reassure those who are otherwise com-
177 See Kahan, note 176, at 74. R
178 See Bowles & Gintis, note 176, at 10. R
179 Kahan, note 176, at 83. R
180 See id. at 82 (“If individuals believe those around them are inclined to pay their
taxes, they will (as a result of guilt, shame, pride, and the like) be more likely to com-
ply. . .”).  See also Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment:
State Tax Results, Minnesota Dep’t of Revenue (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.taxes.
state.mn.us/ (reporting that news of high tax compliance had “positive effect on reported
income and taxes paid” by individual taxpayers).
181 See, e.g., Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire?, in
Why People Pay Taxes 211-14 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (demonstrating that taxpayers who
read reports regarding the “tax gap” were less likely to comply with the tax system).
182 See, e.g., Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, Forbes, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122 (discussing
instances of general tax noncompliance).
183 See Mazza, note 59, at 1081. R
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mitted to compliance that tax evaders are getting their just
desserts.”184  Further, Mazza argues that compliant taxpayers would
be unlikely to reduce their own tax compliance in response to shaming
sanctions because they may view the featured offenders as “dishonest
outliers”185 rather than individuals who share their moral values.
2. Effect on Conservative Tax Directors
If the government were to use shaming sanctions to punish the type
of high-profile corporations that often engage in abusive tax planning,
reciprocity theory suggests that conservative corporate tax directors
could be encouraged to change their behavior by claiming tax posi-
tions that are more aggressive than those they historically have
authorized.
When deciding whether to authorize the use of a particular corpo-
rate tax strategy, every tax director must reach his or her own deter-
mination of the likelihood that the Service would challenge or a court
would reject the strategy as abusive.186  This determination regarding
the chances of an audit or judicial rejection of claimed tax benefits, as
Sarah Lawsky has explained, represents the tax director’s “belief
about whether the event will occur.”187  This belief may be informed
by advice from her corporation’s outside tax lawyers or
accountants.188
184 Id.  Leandra Lederman has also questioned Kahan’s reasoning regarding the effect
of publicity of tax noncompliance on other taxpayers.  Lederman, note 13, at 1484-88. R
185 Mazza, note 59, at 1080. R
186 Because the designation of a corporate tax strategy as abusive depends on the Ser-
vice’s or a court’s ex post application of broad tax standards like the economic substance
and business purpose doctrines, corporate tax directors frequently make tax reporting deci-
sions under significant legal uncertainty.  The Code presents a broad tax standard that
defines a corporate tax shelter as a transaction with a “significant purpose of . . . avoidance
of Federal income tax.”  IRC § 6662(d)(2)(C).  This guidance for corporations stands in
marked contrast to the tax rules that the Code provides for individuals regarding whether
their tax positions constitute tax shelters.  In response to the individual tax shelter boom of
the 1970’s and 1980’s, Congress enacted the passive loss provisions of § 469, which have
been described as the “silver bullet” that halted the widespread use of abusive tax shelters
by individuals.  Chirelstein & Zelenak, note 2, at 1951.  These provisions are clear, objec- R
tive tax rules that dictate, in advance, that an individual may not use a particular scheme to
claim valuable tax losses unless the individual “materially participates” in the activity.  IRC
§ 469(h) (defining “material participation”).  The Code, however, contains no parallel sil-
ver bullet rules that provide corporations with definitive advance notice that their claimed
tax benefits are improper.
187 Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 159 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1017, 1023 (2009).
188 See id. at 1038.
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The tolerance for pursuing tax strategies with uncertain legal out-
comes varies among tax directors.189  A conservative tax director may
engage in a corporate tax strategy, for example, only if he believes
there is at least a 70% chance that a court would respect the claimed
tax benefits and a law firm has provided a legal opinion stating that
the tax strategy “should” comply with the tax law.190  An aggressive
tax director, on the other hand, may implement a tax avoidance strat-
egy even if he believes that the chances of success in court are low.
The aggressive tax director may be comfortable authorizing the use of
a tax strategy that he believes would have a 20% chance of success in
court and regarding which a law firm has merely opined has a “rea-
sonable basis” under the tax law.191
Tax directors currently operate under a certain level of ignorance
regarding the tax positions that their counterparts at competing corpo-
rations have claimed.  For example, a tax shelter promoter may call
the tax director of every Fortune 500 corporation to pitch a new cor-
porate tax reduction strategy that the promoter claims can enable a
corporation to enjoy millions of dollars in foreign tax credits.192  When
a conservative tax director receives this call, she may conclude that
this tax strategy has a 20% chance of success.  This probability of suc-
cess is far below her belief threshold for tax strategy investment, so
the tax director rejects the strategy as overly risky.  While the tax di-
rector is aware that the tax shelter promoter is likely contacting many
tax directors regarding the strategy, she is unaware of exactly how
many or which of her counterparts at other corporations ultimately
will decide to engage in the strategy.193  She may even assume that
189 For further discussion of the role of taxpayer identity as an aggressive or conserva-
tive type, see Blank, note 38, at 1656; Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Tax- R
payer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 689, 701 (2009), (describing
taxpayers as “gamers” and “non-gamers”).
190 For discussion of the range of legal opinions and their corresponding percentage
chances of success, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr, The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with
Emphasis on the “Should” Opinion, 98 Tax Notes 1125 (Feb. 17, 2003).
191 See id. at 1127.
192 See Bankman, note 1, at 1776, 1789 (discussing role of tax shelter promoter in mass- R
marketed tax shelters).
193 There are several explanations for the current lack of transparency regarding the tax
activities of corporations, including those that are publicly traded.  First, as previously
noted, the Service is prohibited from publicly revealing the contents of corporate tax re-
turns.  IRC § 6103(a).  Second, despite efforts of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board to force corporations to highlight in publicly available filings information regarding
tax positions that they view as uncertain, see Financial Accounting Standards Board, Ac-
counting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, FASB Interpretation No. 48 (2006), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2048.pdf, corporations frequently provide vague explanations
of such tax positions.  For example, when describing its uncertain tax positions in accor-
dance with FIN 48, one corporation stated that “[i]t is difficult to project how unrecognized
tax benefits will change over the next 12 months but it is reasonably possible that they
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very few, if any, of her peer tax directors at other corporations would
authorize their corporations to pursue the strategy since she quickly
concluded that it had such a low probability of success.
The proposed shaming sanctions for corporate tax abuse, however,
would alter the state of ignorance in which the typical conservative tax
director currently makes decisions regarding potential tax avoidance
strategies.  In contrast to the curtain of taxpayer confidentiality that
prevents tax directors from learning the tax positions that their coun-
terparts at other corporations have claimed, shaming sanctions would
publicly reveal the identity of some of the corporations that have pur-
sued tax strategies that the conservative tax director believed to be
abusive.
But how would shaming sanctions lead conservative tax directors to
alter their tax reporting behavior?  Would conservative tax directors
begin authorizing the use of the very abusive tax strategies that sham-
ing sanctions would reveal their aggressive counterparts at other cor-
porations have authorized?
Such a copycat response from conservative tax directors is unrealis-
tic.  Shaming sanctions would at least define the specific tax strategies
that the Service views as potentially abusive.  Even some aggressive
tax directors probably would cease participating in a tax strategy that
has triggered a shaming sanction and instead explore other tax strate-
gies of which the Service was not yet aware.194  More importantly, rec-
iprocity theory does not imply that upon learning of bad acts
performed by others, compliant actors will imitate those precise bad
acts.  Rather, the theory posits that if compliant actors perceive that
many other actors are not contributing toward a public good, they
may reduce or change their own voluntary contributions.195
Accordingly, the more likely manifestation of the chump effect in
the context of corporate tax planning is that shaming sanctions could
cause otherwise conservative tax directors to feel pressure, whether
internally or at the direction of senior management, to increase ag-
gressive tax planning.  For example, if a conservative tax director were
to learn, due to shaming sanctions, that a tax director of a well-known,
respected corporation had authorized the use of a tax strategy that the
conservative tax director believed had only a 20% chance of success
should change significantly.”  Marie Leone, FIN 48:  Standing Naked Before the IRS, May
22, 2007, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9216349.  Last, some tax shelters may
be “homegrown,” the product of a single corporate tax director working with advisors, so
that knowledge of this type of tax shelter may not be prevalent among tax directors.
194 Similar responses from taxpayers have occurred in response to IRS designations of
tax strategies as “listed transactions” or “transactions of interest.”  See note 38 and accom- R
panying text.
195 See Bowles & Gintis, note 176, at 10. R
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on the merits, the conservative tax director could begin to feel like a
chump for only engaging in transactions that she believed had a 70%
chance of success.  Rather than insist that that her corporation only
engage in tax strategies that she believed have a 70% chance of suc-
cess on the merits, the information resulting from shaming sanctions
could lead the conservative tax director to conclude that her corpora-
tion should pursue tax strategies that have a 51% chance of success
(suitable for a “more likely than not” legal opinion from a tax law-
yer196) or even a 35% to 40% chance of success (suitable for a “sub-
stantial authority” legal opinion from a tax lawyer197).  Put differently,
in response to publicity that the tax director of a well-known corpora-
tion had authorized the use of a highly questionable tax strategy, the
conservative tax director could think to herself “if that’s the type of
transaction that the Service views as a tax shelter, then we should con-
sider adopting less conservative tax reporting behavior.”
There are significant reasons, in light of reciprocity theory, to sus-
pect that the use of shaming sanctions to punish corporations that
have pursued abusive tax shelters could cause conservative tax direc-
tors to feel like chumps for engaging in cautious tax reporting while
other tax directors claimed tax positions at the opposite end of the
spectrum.
First, the use of shaming sanctions for corporate tax abuse could
reveal to conservative tax directors that the tax directors of highly visi-
ble, respected corporations—not rogues—have engaged in abusive tax
activity.  As Kahan has argued, if a taxpayer develops the impression
that other taxpayers who share similar characteristics have failed to
comply with the tax law, the taxpayer may develop a “reciprocal mo-
tive to evade.”198  It is unlikely that a conservative tax director would
describe the corporations that have participated in abusive tax shelters
since the late 1990’s as rogues or “dishonest outliers.”199  A sampling
includes:  American Home Products Corp.,200 Black & Decker,201
196 Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4).
197 Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3); Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the “Authorities”:  Determin-
ing Valid Legal Authority in Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns
and Avoiding Penalties, 66 Taxes 1072, 1127-28 (1988).
198 Kahan, note 176, at 83. R
199 Mazza, note 59, at 1080.  The arguments of shaming advocates, like Mazza, are more R
persuasive when applied to settings where the government publicly shames taxpayers, such
as tax delinquents, who have committed violations of explicit tax rules.  State revenue offi-
cials have described these types of taxpayers publicly as “the worst of the worst” because
they have simply refused to pay their outstanding tax liabilities despite repeated requests
from the taxing authorities and even court orders.  See Walters, note 138. R
200 Randall Smith, IRS Battles Colgate Over an Arcane Deal That Cut Its Tax Bill, Wall
St. J., May 3, 1996, at A1 (reporting testimony before Tax Court by Merrill executive re-
garding sale of tax shelter products to American Home Products Corp.).
201 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006).
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Borden,202 Colgate-Palmolive,203 Coltec Industries,204 Compaq,205
Dow Chemical,206 General Electric,207 GlaxoSmithKline,208 H.J.
Heinz,209 Merck,210 Merrill Lynch,211 Procter & Gamble,212 UPS,213
Winn-Dixie214 and Wal-Mart.215  One reason why shaming sanctions
could apply to such a list of corporations is that, unlike an act prohib-
ited by a clear tax rule, corporate tax abuse is not an offense that
corporate managers can identify with absolute certainty in advance.
Many aggressive corporate tax managers, even at prominent corpora-
tions, have pursued tax strategies that, upon subsequent audit or re-
view, the Service or a court has rejected as abusive.216
Second, shaming sanctions may not produce visible reductions in
corporate tax abuse, thus failing to convince conservative tax directors
that the government has the ability to prevent its occurrence in the
future.  By attempting to shame corporations for engaging in an of-
fense that is not absolutely apparent until an adjudicator applies a tax
202 Smith, note 200, at A1 (reporting testimony before Tax Court by Merrill executive R
regarding sale of tax shelter products to Borden).
203 ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
204 Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
205 Compaq v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
206 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006).
207 TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006).
208 Press Release, IRS, IRS Accepts Settlement Offer in Largest Transfer Pricing Dis-
pute (Sept. 11, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=162359,00.
html.
209 H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
210 Press Release, note 85. R
211 ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 233 (3d Cir. 1998).
212 See Novack & Saunders, note 1, at 198 (discussing Proctor and Gamble’s participa- R
tion in a “corporate-owned life insurance” tax shelter).
213 United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir.
2001).
214 Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001).
215 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d. 312 (Del. 2004) (describing
Wal-Mart’s 2002 settlement with IRS regarding “corporate-owned life insurance” tax
shelter).
216 Consider, for example, the “Son of BOSS” tax strategy, one of the most infamous tax
shelters of the last decade.  Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255.  When corporations initially
pursued that strategy, which involved a partnership’s assumption of liabilities in order to
create an artificial tax loss, they did not know with certainty that the Service would later
reject it as a tax shelter.  The transaction appeared to fit within the literal confines of the
relevant tax law.  After the Service ruled that it considered the Son of BOSS strategy an
abusive tax shelter, and designated it as a listed transaction, Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B.
255, it announced that corporations that had participated in the strategy could enter settle-
ments with the Service that offered certain favorable terms.  See Press Release, IRS,
Strong Response to “Son of BOSS” Settlement Initiative (July 1, 2004), available at http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=124937,00.html.  Within months, more than 1,500 tax-
payers voluntarily approached the IRS to settle deficiencies related to this strategy.  Id.  If
the Service were to adopt the shaming sanctions discussed earlier, it would publicize the
names of the many corporations that had invested in this tax shelter.
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standard, the government could appear to conservative tax directors
to be setting a mouse trap over and over again, without actually eradi-
cating the mouse problem.  In the fall of 2006, for example, former
U.S. Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy, Pamela Olson, boldly
declared:  “the tax shelter war is over” and “[t]he government
won.”217  Following Olson’s public proclamation of victory, however,
numerous high-profile tax shelter settlements and cases occurred.218
If shaming sanctions were to fail to reduce dramatically instances of
corporate tax abuse, conservative tax directors could develop the im-
pression that abusive tax planning is widespread.219
B. Backlash
Another unintended consequence of implementing public shaming
as punishment for corporate tax abuse is that it could provoke harmful
backlash from tax directors and from the general taxpaying public.
Some tax directors could react to the threat of shaming sanctions, at
least in the short term, by complying with tax reporting obligations in
ways that could reduce the chance that their corporations would be
subject to the sanctions.  A potential response from some tax directors
to the threat of shaming sanctions could be to attempt to navigate the
vast tax shelter reporting rules under current law by “overdisclosing”
information that would fail to advance the agency’s tax shelter detec-
tion efforts.220
In addition, the use of shaming sanctions for this particular offense
could weaken general taxpaying morale.  Rather than protest or boy-
cott the corporations that shaming sanctions would reveal have pur-
sued abusive tax shelters, the general taxpaying public could turn its
ire against the government that enacted loopholes in the corporate tax
law that enabled these types of tax shelters to flourish.
217 Pamela Olson, Now that You’ve Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to Do with
It?  Observations from the Frontlines, the Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So to Speak,
Erwin Griswold Lecture, American College of Tax Counsel, reprinted in 60 Tax Law. 567,
567 (2006).
218 For example, since Olson’s announcement, the Service has:  (1) litigated high-profile
corporate tax shelter cases, see, e.g., H.J. Heinz Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (Fed.
Cl. 2007), (2) issued public press releases announcing settlements with large corporate tax-
payers, see, e.g., Press Release, note 208; and (3) designated new tax strategies as listed R
transactions, see Service Notice 2007-57, I.R.B. 2007-29 (describing loss importation
transaction).
219 By contrast, state revenue agencies have been attracted to shaming websites for tax
delinquents because they apparently lead to significant and visible reductions in state tax
delinquency that may reassure compliant taxpayers.  See Walters, note 138.  Consistent R
with this statement, Lederman concludes that taxpayers may not feel like chumps if they
perceive that the government is cracking down on tax cheats.  Lederman, note 13, at 1497. R
220 See Blank, note 38, for detailed discussion. R
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Below, I discuss each of these potential forms of backlash and why
each form would be counterproductive to effective tax administration
objectives.
1. Overdisclosure as a Defense
A perception appears to exist currently among some tax directors
that tax shelter publicity may result in reputational harm for their cor-
porations or for themselves.221  As I have argued, the foundation of
this fear is shaky.222  If the government were to implement the types
of shaming measures that their advocates have proposed, over time,
tax directors would likely recognize that publicity of their corpora-
tions’ abusive tax planning activities do not cause their feared
harms—such as stock price drops, consumer outrage, and loss of their
own jobs—to materialize.
But in the short term, some tax directors could respond to the
threat of tax shelter publicity by attempting to protect their corpora-
tions from the application of shaming sanctions.  A plausible avenue
for avoiding shaming sanctions that tax directors could pursue could
be to alter their compliance with the Service’s tax shelter reporting
rules.
The Service currently requires corporations to disclose significant
information to it regarding certain activities that could bear tax shelter
traits.223  Corporations must disclose detailed information regarding
its participation in any listed transactions224 and other transactions
that involve common features of tax shelters, such as transactions that
are subject to confidentiality restrictions.225  At the extreme end of the
spectrum, corporations must also disclose their participation in “trans-
actions of interest,”226 which the Service has defined broadly as trans-
221 According to a 2004 survey of 250 corporate tax directors conducted by Ernst &
Young, 70% of the tax directors interviewed stated that “tax risk management is critical to
preserving the organization’s overall reputation” and nearly 75% stated that the opinions
of media analysts are “an important factor in planning a new tax strategy.”  Ernst &
Young, note 96, at 6; see also Canellos, note 98 (“corporations regard tax risk as an impor- R
tant aspect of overall risk management, subject to close CEO scrutiny because of its effect
on reputation and ‘franchise’”); PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, note 104, at 9 (commenting R
that “more than one tax strategy we have seen have included policies such as ‘We will not
undertake any tax planning transaction which would reflect adversely on the group if de-
tails of it were to be published in the business pages of [Daily Newspaper Title]’”); Martin
A. Sullivan, Reputation or Lower Taxes?, 108 Tax Notes 981, 981 (Aug. 29, 2005)(describ-
ing management sensitivity to negative tax shelter publicity).
222 See Part III.
223 Reg. § 1.6011-4 (taxpayer disclosure requirements).
224 Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (requirements for listed transactions).
225 Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (requirements for reportable transactions).
226 Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(6) (requirements for transactions of interest).
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actions that bear the “potential for tax avoidance or evasion. . .”227
The tax shelter disclosure rules are designed to provide the Service
with information that will enable it to determine whether a particular
corporation has engaged in a transaction that constitutes a tax shelter.
As practitioners have commented, the broad scope of these rules,
each of which “has a complicated definition, and exceptions to that
definition, and then exceptions to the exceptions”228 has created a
“tax environment of excessive reporting.”229
It is unlikely that tax directors would simply stop complying with
the Service’s disclosure rules to protest its use of shaming sanctions.
Although such an action could effectively deprive the Service of infor-
mation critical to its ability to detect corporations’ participation in tax
shelters and thus reduce the chance of shaming sanctions, the Service
could subject their corporations to hefty monetary tax penalties for
each act of nondisclosure.230  And under current law, a corporation
that pays a monetary tax penalty for failing to disclose requested in-
formation to the Service must publicly disclose its payment of that tax
penalty, which, after all, is a form of public shaming.231  Nondisclo-
sure, as a result, is an unattractive option.
A more likely response of tax directors to the threat of shaming
sanctions for corporate tax abuse could be to overdisclose information
regarding their corporations’ tax activities to the Service.  Rather than
simply provide the Service with concise and specific information about
a corporation’s most questionable tax positions, a tax director could
provide the Service with voluminous information about every transac-
tion that arguably fits within one of the tax shelter reporting catego-
ries.232  Since Congress enacted in 2004 high monetary penalties for
corporations that fail to disclose participation in reportable transac-
tions, tax directors have frequently engaged in overdisclosure to avoid
the monetary penalties without raising clearly visible red flags for au-
ditors regarding suspect transactions.233
Overdisclosure would be a natural strategy for a tax director who
could be concerned that the Service could subject her corporation to
227 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 71 F.R. 64488 (Nov. 2, 2006) (emphasis added).
228 Mark Weinstein & Sarah Lawsky, Tax Shelter Angst, GC New York, Feb. 13, 2006 at
1, available at http://www.hhlaw.com/files/Publication/80df4ec1-63a9-420d-b8dc-14a78f04
1399/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9736f34b-034a-4ea7-a376-6df7d1105c03/Wein-
stein_Lawsky_article.pdf.
229 Id. at 1.
230 See note 64. R
231 See note 65. R
232 For detailed discussion of overdisclosure in response to the enactment of high mone-
tary penalties for taxpayers that fail to disclose to the Service information required by the
tax shelter reporting rules, see Blank, note 38, at 1662-64. R
233 See id.
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shaming sanctions as a result of any of her corporation’s aggressive tax
positions.  The overdisclosure strategy could force the Service to focus
on documentation regarding highly complex transactions that ulti-
mately may lack abusive tax shelter qualities, rather than tax strate-
gies that are motivated primarily by tax-avoidance purposes.  Using
this strategy, a tax director could comply in a technical sense with the
tax shelter reporting rules, while diminishing the Service’s opportunity
to detect the corporation’s use of the type of abusive tax strategies
would likely result in the imposition of shaming sanctions.
Tax directors would have many incentives under current law to pur-
sue the strategy of overdisclosure in response to the risk of shaming
sanctions.  Unlike acts of nondisclosure, corporations are subject to no
monetary tax penalty for providing the Service with multiple reporta-
ble transaction statements or excessive quantities of information.  In-
deed, the Regulations appear to encourage the overdisclosure
reaction.  Corporations are required to disclose information to the
Service regarding transactions that are “substantially similar”234 to
listed transactions and transactions of interest.  The Regulations com-
ment that this phrase should be “broadly construed in favor of disclo-
sure.”235  Overdisclosure could be an effective, yet permissible, way
for tax directors to impede the ability of the Service to publicize their
corporations’ use of tax shelters.
The risk of overdisclosure could diminish the Service’s ability to
combat the corporate tax abuse problem.  When corporations provide
the Service with detailed information about their most questionable
transactions or those that contain obvious tax shelter traits, the Ser-
vice may identify certain trends in aggressive tax planning and issue
targeted administrative notices that could prevent corporations from
engaging in these strategies in the future.236  If corporations deliver so
much information to the Service that its agents must spend excessive
time reviewing it, however, the value of the information disclosed de-
creases.  As a representative of the Service’s Large and Midsize Divi-
sion commented in 2006, “If the default approach becomes disclosing
every transaction, the system is not going to work.”237
234 Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).
235 Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4).
236 Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue Charles Rossotti has stated that disclo-
sure of a wide array of information enables the Service to “distinguish between a legitimate
business transaction and one that inappropriately manipulates the Code.” Press Release,
U.S. Treas. Dep’t, Statement of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Charles O. Rossotti on
Corporate Tax Shelters (Mar. 20, 2002), available at http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/
po2020.htm.
237 Crystal Tandon, IRS Seeing Overdisclsoure of Reportable Transactions, Officials
Say, 2006 TNT 197-2 (Oct. 12, 2006), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (quoting Chris-
topher B. Sterner, IRS Division Counsel, Large and Midsize Business Division).
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2. Decrease in Taxpaying Morale
Publicity that high-profile corporations have engaged in abusive tax
activity could also weaken general taxpaying morale, the willingness
of taxpayers to trust and support the Service.238  Upon learning of spe-
cific instances of high-profile corporate tax abuse, taxpayers could as-
sume that the problem of tax avoidance is so widespread that the
Service is incapable of controlling it.  They could make this intuitive
leap because individuals often make judgments as a result of what
they can easily remember, such as the actions of a few highly visible
corporations, rather than a complete data set.239  Individual taxpayers
have commented, for example, that the corporate tax abuse problem
is so widespread that the Service “is a poor match against Goliath
corporations.”240
Further, rather than expressing outrage at the corporations that
would subject be to shaming sanctions, taxpayers could instead turn
their anger toward Congress and the Service for allowing corporate
tax “loopholes” to exist.241
A decrease in general taxpaying morale as a result of publicity of
corporate tax abuse could have adverse consequences for tax adminis-
tration efforts.  Studies have demonstrated that weakened taxpaying
morale tends to lead to reductions in overall tax compliance.242  Fur-
ther, public outrage over the government’s inability to prevent the ex-
ploitation of statutory loopholes in the past could inhibit the Service’s
frequent attempts to garner public support for increased enforcement
resources.243  The general public could perceive shaming sanctions as
238 See Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J.
Comp. Econ. 136, 136 (2007) (finding “a high correlation between perceived tax evasion
and tax morale”).
239 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Availability:  A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, 5 Cog. Psych. 207 (1974) (describing the “availability” heuristic).
240 Pragna Patel, Letter to the Editor, Avoiding Taxes: Shelters of Shame, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 2000, at 17A.
241 Consider, for example, one citizen’s letter to the editor following a newspaper article
detailing instances of corporate tax abuse: “I can’t believe that the ‘representatives’ we pay
can be so incompetent as to make regulations that allow companies to avoid taxes (that I
have to make up) . . . How is it that the crooks are always smarter than the people we pay
to represent us, and why does it take so long to start action to close the loopholes that
shouldn’t have existed in the first place?”  W.L. Head, Letter to the Editor, Close the
Loopholes Before They Open, St. Pete. Times, Mar. 15, 2000, at 17A.  Put differently, in
the immortal words of Edward Albee, “You gotta have swine to show you where the truf-
fles are.”  Edward Albee, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1962).
242 See Sheffrin & Triest, note 181, at 211-14. R
243 Some scholars have speculated that the Service deliberately fuels reports that its
budget is limited to create pressure on Congress to increase its resources.  See, e.g., Kahan,
note 176, at 84. R
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an indication that the Service has merely collected “low-hanging
fruit,” rather than eliminated corporations’ aggressive tax planning.244
C. Increased Litigation
Last, the use of shaming sanctions could inadvertently encourage
tax shelter litigation, which, in turn, could further deteriorate public
confidence in the tax system.
1. Public Versus Private Dispute Resolution
A regime of shaming sanctions could reduce the negotiating lever-
age that the Service currently possesses when attempting to resolve
tax shelter disputes with corporations.  Today, a corporation’s tax di-
rector generally has two choices upon receiving notice from the Ser-
vice that it believes his corporation has participated in a tax shelter:
He can settle the dispute with the Service or challenge the Service’s
characterization in U.S. Tax Court, District Court, or the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims.245  If the tax director settles with the Service, the
corporation’s concession that it has engaged in a tax shelter occurs
behind a curtain of taxpayer confidentiality;246 if the tax director
chooses to litigate, however, the corporation’s challenge occurs in the
sunlight of the public courts.  The Service has used this distinction to
its advantage in the past tax shelter disputes by convincing “publicity-
averse” corporate tax directors to settle close cases rather than liti-
gate.247  Although the fear that tax shelter publicity could harm a cor-
poration’s reputation may be unfounded, some tax directors possess
this fear and attribute value to the confidential nature of settlement as
a way to resolve tax shelter disputes.
It is possible, therefore, that shaming sanctions would cause some
corporations to choose litigation over settlement.  Of course, litiga-
tion, like settlement accompanied by a shaming sanction, would force
a corporation to reveal its involvement in a transaction deemed by the
Service to be a tax shelter.  But litigation, unlike settlement, would
provide a corporation with the opportunity to tell its side of the story
244 One veteran IRS agent has compared his audits of the largest corporations’ tax re-
turns, each of which may consist of tens of thousands of pages, to working in an orchard
without ladders, where “[y]ou can grab all the low-hanging fruit in a few highly productive
hours, while leaving most of the harvest untouched.” David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Agents
Feel Pressed to End Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 2007, at A1.
245 See IRC § 6213 (procedures for Tax Court litigation), § 7422 (procedures for civil
actions for tax refunds).
246 See IRC § 6103(a).
247 Press Release, IRS, IRS Settlement Initiative (Oct. 2005) available at http://www.irs.
gov/irs/article/0,,id=150073,00.html (describing terms of initiative to enter settlements with
taxpayers regarding listed transactions, including taxpayer confidentiality).
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publicly.  A corporation’s managers could make arguments in a trial
that could persuade the community that they did not believe they
were violating any rules when claiming the tax position at issue.  As
tax shelter litigation tends to attract attention in the business press
and mainstream media, it could enable a corporation’s managers to
deflect potential reputational harm that tax shelter publicity could
cause.
Further, a publicity-averse tax director could favor public litigation
over public settlement because the nature of tax shelters means there
is a significant chance that his corporation could prevail on substan-
tive legal grounds.  Because “economic substance” and “business pur-
pose” essentially exist in the eye of the beholder,248 it is possible that a
court could disagree with the Service’s assertion that a particular
transaction lacks these qualities.249  A judicial victory would certainly
reduce a perception in the community’s eyes that the corporation is a
“tax cheat” or that its managers otherwise have “clouded business
ethics.”250  The possibility of judicial affirmation of a corporation’s tax
position could entice the publicity-averse tax director to litigate rather
than accept the branding of his corporation as a tax shelter
participant.
2. Dangers of Increased Litigation
Increased tax shelter litigation is problematic because it could am-
plify publicity of abusive tax activities of corporations, raise the possi-
bility that the government could suffer high-profile judicial losses, and
drain valuable enforcement resources that the government otherwise
could use to address other, more costly types of tax noncompliance.
High-profile tax shelter trials could raise public consciousness of
abusive tax activities of corporations, possibly exacerbating the chump
effect among conservative tax directors.251  Litigation, of course, ex-
tends over significant periods of time and could attract even more cov-
erage in the business and other press than an announcement by the
Service that a particular corporation has paid a monetary tax penalty
for participating in a tax shelter.  Further, litigation would force the
government to describe, in detail and in public, why a particular cor-
poration’s tax position results from a sham transaction.  If shaming
sanctions could increase the frequency of tax shelter litigation, such
248 For further discussion, see Lederman, note 13, at 30-58. R
249 See note 252 and accompanying text for discussion of the inconsistent judicial case R
law regarding corporate tax shelters.
250 See Grassley, note 77. R
251 For discussion of the chump effect, see notes 176-219 and accompanying text. [X] R
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increased publicity could reinforce the perception of compliant tax-
payers that corporate tax abuse is widespread.
A more significant problem is that it is possible that courts in high-
profile cases could disagree with the Service’s application of standards
like the economic substance requirement.  The government has lost
significant tax shelter cases for this reason over the last decade.252  In
Black & Decker’s litigation with the Service over its contingent liabil-
ity tax shelter, for example, the trial court in the case sided with the
corporation.253  The judge openly admired Black & Decker’s literal
reading of the Code as “a thing of grace and beauty.”254  Similar judi-
cial losses could lead taxpayers to view corporate tax abuse not as a
socially offensive act, but rather as an exercise in creative statutory
interpretation.  This perception could lead corporations to embrace
aggressive tax planning.  As one commentator noted, the district court
decision in Black & Decker “seemed to encourage taxpayers to con-
tinue to regard hefty tax advantages as a key element in planning their
business affairs.”255
An increase in tax shelter litigation could also consume valuable tax
enforcement resources.  The increased expense seems especially ex-
cessive when considering that corporate tax abuse actually represents
a relatively small portion of the overall federal tax gap.  According to
Treasury, in 2001, the tax gap was $345 billion.256  Of this $345 billion
tax gap, less than 10% of it, $32 billion, was attributable to corporate
tax noncompliance.257  Individual income and employment tax non-
compliance, on the other hand, represents the vast bulk of the tax gap.
By encouraging more corporations to pursue tax shelter litigation,
shaming sanctions could force the government to spend valuable tax
enforcement resources on defending its tax findings in court, rather
than on preventing more costly forms of tax noncompliance.
252 See, e.g., Compaq v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); Boca Investerings
P’ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (involving transaction of American
Home Products); IES Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); United Parcel
Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
253 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp.2d 621 (D. Md. 2004).
254 Transcript of Motions Hearing Before the Honorable William D. Quarles 28-29 (July
30, 2004), discussed in Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker’s Contingent Liability Shelter: “A
Thing of Grace and Beauty”?, 106 Tax Notes 577 (Jan. 31, 2005).
255 Leone, note 115. R
256 Treasury Dep’t, Office of Tax Pol’y, A Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing the Tax
Gap 6 (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otptaxgapstrategy
%20final.pdf.
257 Id. at 6.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a comprehensive analysis of the use of
shaming sanctions to address the problem of corporate tax abuse.  As
I have argued, there are strong reasons to doubt that the threat of
corporate shaming sanctions could effectively deter corporate manag-
ers from pursuing abusive tax shelters.  There are also strong reasons
to suspect that, when applied to this particular type of tax offense,
shaming sanctions could have potentially adverse effects on important
aspects of tax compliance.
The use of shaming sanctions would be unlikely to achieve deter-
rence objectives.  The community’s lack of hostility in the past toward
corporations that have pursued tax shelters, the potential for shaming
sanctions to send a positive signal to investors searching for corpora-
tions with aggressive tax directors, and the low probability of personal
loss for tax directors are factors that, taken together, could cause cor-
porate managers to discount heavily the adverse consequences of
shaming sanctions.
Further, the use of shaming sanctions could result in unintended
consequences that could weaken aspects of tax compliance.  If the
government were to apply shaming sanctions against corporate tax
shelter participants, otherwise conservative tax directors could alter
their own tax reporting behavior in response; some tax directors could
hamper the Service’s detection efforts by overdisclosing information
to the agency; general taxpaying morale could decline; and tax direc-
tors could resort to expensive litigation to challenge the Service’s ex
post characterizations of particular transactions as tax shelters.
Justice Louis Brandeis once famously commented of public disclo-
sure efforts, “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.”258  As this Article has demon-
strated, however, in the context of corporate tax abuse, the power of
the public spotlight may not only be dim, but may have a dark side as
well.
258 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How The Bankers Use It 92 (1914).
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